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This dissertation investigates what the causes of moral beliefs indicate about the epistemic status 
of those beliefs. I argue that information about the causes of moral beliefs can tell us whether 
those beliefs track the truth, and that truth tracking is the primary epistemic property that should 
concern us in the moral domain. I formulate three novel debunking arguments that employ 
information about the causes of moral beliefs to support conclusions about truth tracking while 
minimizing normative assumptions. These arguments lead to the conclusion that harm-related 
moral beliefs that hinge on sympathy, moral beliefs influenced by disgust, certain political 
beliefs, and beliefs about punishment that are subject to the influence of extraneous emotions do 
not track moral truth. For each of these types of moral beliefs, information about the proximal 
causes of the moral belief supports epistemic conclusions. I compare the value of information 
about proximal and distal causes for assessing epistemic status: I argue that proximal causes are 
a superior source of information, but under certain conditions, we should take information about 
distal causes into account. In the case of beliefs about the fair distribution of resources, 
information about their proximal causes may be consistent with us tracking truth, but information 
about their distal, evolutionary origins tell us that we lack reason to think that we track their 
 v 
truth. Thus, using empirical information about the causes of moral beliefs, I offer selective 
debunking arguments for five types of moral beliefs. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation considers the significance of the causes of moral beliefs for the epistemic status 
of those beliefs. Recent empirical research offers us evidence about the variety of psychological 
and biological factors that influence our beliefs about moral principles and the judgments we 
make about moral situations. Such research raises questions about whether the influence of 
certain types of causes should lead us to reduce confidence in our moral beliefs.    
In the second chapter, I lay the epistemological groundwork for the rest of dissertation. I 
argue that in the moral domain, we should primarily be concerned with fulfilling any obligations 
we might have. For this purpose, our primary epistemic concern should be whether we are likely 
to have the right beliefs about claims related to our obligations—such as that we ought to relieve 
the suffering of others if it comes at little cost to us, or that we ought to give up our seat on the 
bus under certain circumstances.  The tendency to have the right beliefs about these claims can 
be captured in terms of truth tracking, an epistemic property that has been most helpfully 
elaborated by Sherrilyn Roush: roughly, a person tracks the truth if she has a high probability 
that she believes a claim when it is true and a high probability that she disbelieves the claim 
when it is false. I defend the view that truth tracking, regardless of its relation to knowledge and 
justification, is the primary epistemic property that should concern us in the moral domain. In 
making this point, I follow Alston’s practice of focusing on desirable properties of beliefs rather 
than knowledge or justification (2005). I argue that with information about the causes of beliefs, 
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we can evaluate whether we track the truth of the propositions we believe.  
In the third chapter, I argue that more proximal causal processes like emotions and 
reasoning processes are a better source of evidence for assessing whether we track the truth than 
distal process like cultural or evolutionary histories. As a result, investigations into the epistemic 
status of our beliefs using information about their causes should begin with the information we 
have about proximal psychological faculties. In this chapter I also develop three distinct 
argumentative strategies for debunking. The first strategy is to identify a step in the belief 
production process that we can show empirically is not performing the function it would need to 
perform for the process to track the truth, and to infer from this that our belief forming process 
does not allow us to track the truth. I call this the malfunctioning component argument. The 
second strategy, using metaethical rather than normative assumptions, is to show that the 
variability in the truth value of a proposition is inconsistent with the variability in our attitudes 
about the proposition. I call this the argument from inconsistent variability. Third, I characterize 
a debunking strategy based on the improbability of having the belief one happens to have. 
I present several cases to illustrate these three arguments as well as to illustrate the point 
that we can draw skeptical conclusions on the basis of information about proximal causes alone. 
My first case, to illustrate the malfunctioning component argument, examines the influence of 
sympathy on moral beliefs. I begin by supposing that if sympathy were to contribute to truth 
tracking moral judgments, it would do so by picking out entities that are suffering. I appeal to 
empirical work to argue that we cannot rely on sympathy to perform this function because it is 
highly vulnerable both to false positives—cases where we think there is suffering but there is 
not, which may occur in response to robots, for instance—and false negatives—cases where we 
think there is no suffering but there is, which may occur as a result of out-group biases, for 
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instance. Second, I argue that certain properties of disgust mean that moral beliefs influenced by 
disgust are not tracking the truth of the propositions in question. Empirical work shows that 
disgustingness is “sticky”—it is too transmittable, too easily associated with diverse actions and 
objects, and it is too incorrigible, too resistant to revision once it is associated with an action or 
object. The incorrigibility of disgustingness illustrates one version of the argument from 
inconsistent variability—attitude hypovariability, in which one’s attitudes are too invariable in 
comparison with the variability we expect in the truth value of the proposition. The 
transmissibility of disgustingness illustrates the argument from inappropriately improbable 
belief. In my third and fourth cases, I illustrate the other version of the argument from 
inconsistent variability—attitude hypervariability, in which one’s attitudes vary too much in 
comparison with the variability we expect in the truth value of the proposition—with the case of 
moral political beliefs that are likely to change over one’s lifetime and with the case of 
judgments about punishment that are likely to vary as a result of variation in extraneous 
emotions. In each of the cases I examine in this chapter, we are able to infer that our beliefs are 
not truth tracking on the basis of just an examination of the influence of proximal causes; it is 
unnecessary to also look at more distal causes in these cases. 
In the fourth chapter, I consider a case where even if information about proximal and 
developmental causes of beliefs is consistent with truth tracking, information about distal causes 
should lead us to reduce confidence in our beliefs. This is the case of beliefs about fairness, 
specifically about resource distribution. For instance, one might think that food should be 
distributed according to need, or that it should be distributed according to who contributed the 
most to obtain it. This case illustrates a higher order version of the inappropriately improbable 
belief argument, the third debunking argument that I discussed in the second chapter, which here 
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becomes the inappropriately improbable process argument. Employing a variety of empirical 
evidence, I argue that the evolutionary origins of intuitions about fair distribution of resources 
show that it was improbable that the particular fairness faculty humans currently have would 
evolve, and the intuitions humans have about fair distributions of resources could easily have 
been different. In combination with metaethical assumptions from a realist or commonsense 
view of the nature of morality, the improbability of people’s beliefs in this domain puts us in a 
poor epistemic situation, and we should reduce confidence in these beliefs. 
Even if we start with an assumption that we have a prima facie reason to trust our moral 
faculties or that moral epistemology must be biased toward the truth to avoid skepticism, each of 
these debunking arguments lead to the conclusion that we are in a poor epistemic position. 
1.1 MY DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS IN RELATION TO THE TYPES OF 
DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS IN THE LITERATURE 
There are a variety of views on how causes bear on the epistemic status of beliefs (e.g. White 
2010, Cohen 2000, Bedke 2009, 2014, Goldman 2014, Vavova ms.). On one side, some argue 
that causes do not affect the epistemic status of beliefs and/or do not reveal anything about their 
epistemic status.  On the other side, there is an assortment of causal debunking arguments.1 In 
                                                 
1 For additional discussions of causal debunking arguments, see Griffiths and Wilkins n.d., Ruse 
1986, Shafer-Landau 2012, Sher 2001, Tersman 2008, Machery and Mallon 2010, Brosnan 2011, 
Kahane 2011, 2013, Clark-Doane 2012, Schafer 2013, Schechter 2013, Setiya 2013, Berker 
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this dissertation, the debunking arguments I introduce differ from other characterizations of 
genealogical debunking arguments in the literature. 
Perhaps the most familiar causal debunking argument is what has been called the best 
explanation argument, in which one shows that the best explanation for a belief nowhere appeals 
to the truth of the believed proposition. Varieties of this argument have appeared in e.g. Harman 
1977, 1986, Ruse 1986, Street 2006, and Joyce 2006. For instance, one argument says that if an 
explanation (or a complete explanation or our best explanation) of a belief need not involve the 
fact of the matter, and if we adhere to a principle of parsimony, we (or just realists) lack reason 
to retain the belief. In this dissertation, I will not address debunking arguments that arise from 
explanations of beliefs or from our difficulties explaining moral knowledge or the purported 
reliability of our moral beliefs. 
A second form of etiological debunking argument shows that a belief is the product of a 
process known to be unreliable. Nichols characterizes this sort of argument in his (2014); he 
proposes that there are two types of etiological debunking arguments, one of which is the 
explanation approach that I described above and the other is the process debunking argument. 
Nichols characterizes the process debunking argument as an argument in which one concludes 
that a belief is unjustified by showing that a belief is the product of a process that is known to be 
epistemically defective (e.g., distorting or unreliable), such as dreaming or wishful thinking 
                                                                                                                                                             
2009, Street 2006, 2008, Copp 2009, Wielenberg 2010, Enoch 2010, Skarsaune 2011, Fraser 
2014, and Vavova 2014. 
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(2014, 2; see also Sinnott-Armstrong 2008 for discussion of this sort of argument).2 Another 
account of causal debunking arguments that involves a premise about the epistemic defectiveness 
of one’s process is Kahane’s (2011) reconstruction of evolutionary debunking arguments, which 
requires the premise that one’s process is off-track (106). To advance these sorts of arguments, 
one must assume or supply reasons to think that one’s moral belief process is epistemically 
defective. This is harder to do in the moral domain than in other domains. One way to support a 
premise about the unreliability or truth tracking failure of a process is to employ the irrelevant 
factors argument, and show that a key component of the process that produces the belief is a 
morally irrelevant factor.  
The irrelevant factors argument, though related to the process debunking argument, is 
distinct, and so constitutes a third type of debunking argument. This argument supplies an 
account of some of the causal influences on a belief and shows that some of the important 
influences on the formation of the belief are not responsive to the fact of the matter and does not 
contribute to the process’s responsiveness to the fact of the matter as a background condition that 
                                                 
2 Schafer has also made a related point, that one could conclude one should distrust one’s belief 
if one knows that it is due to an unreliable process or if one knows that for the belief to have a 
high probability of being true, the belief must be the product of one of a small set of processes 
that one knows to be reliable, and that the belief is not produced by one of those processes. 
(Perhaps this implies that one knows that the other processes are unreliable, but the argument is 
driven by the idea that the truth in a particular domain is tricky to get at, and there is only a small 
set of certain sorts of processes that can be relied upon, and so the argument seems potentially 
different in a way that might involve fewer normative assumptions.) 
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helps other factors be responsive to the fact of the matter. The irrelevant factors argument has 
been presented in a number of different ways. Vavova (2014), for instance, says the influence of 
irrelevant factors is bad when it is distorting. Similarly, Mallon and Doris (2013) discuss the 
problem produced when automatic processes are either sensitive to factors unrelated to morality 
or insensitive to factors that are relevant to morality. (They also mention in passing the 
possibility of a very different debunking argument, which operates by showing that moral 
responses might not have the right type of stability needed for them to be reliable. This is the sort 
of concern that my argument from inconsistent variability explicates.) In another domain, Swain 
et al. (2008) discuss the epistemic significance of epistemic intuitions tracking factors that are 
irrelevant to the question at hand (140-141). More precisely, we might interpret the irrelevant 
factors argument this way: (1) S believes p as the result of a process G, which contained factor 
A; (2) S was unlikely to believe p given the absence of factor A in process G, and S was likely to 
believe p given the presence of factor A in process G; (3) factor A is not an indicator or 
determinant of the truth value of p and factor A does not serve as a background condition that 
enables other component factors of the process to function as indicators of A. From these 
premises, one can conclude that process G is an unreliable source for obtaining attitudes about p 
and that S is not tracking the truth of p. 
In this argument, though, one has to show that the allegedly irrelevant factor is in fact not 
an indicator of the truth value of p and is not a background condition conducive to other 
component factors tracking p. This usually involves appealing to normative assumptions. For 
instance, when Greene (2008) writes that deontological intuitions “reflect the influence of 
morally irrelevant factors and are therefore unlikely to track the moral truth,” he has to claim that 
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particular factors are morally irrelevant (70).3 Our deontological intuitions, Greene argues, are 
the product of an automatic process that produces different judgments depending on variation in 
factors such as personal force and spatial distance, which Greene claims are not morally 
relevant.4 Consequently, we must decrease our confidence in moral beliefs formed by these 
automatic processes. However, the assumption that personal force and spatial distance is not a 
determinant of whether an action is right or wrong is not obvious and has attracted objections 
(Berker 2009, Kahane 2013). 
Setting the irrelevant factors argument aside, an alternative way to show that a moral 
process is epistemically defective is to show that it involves a component process or a feature 
that is epistemically defective across contexts. However, as Nichols notes, “sometimes processes 
are defective in some contexts and not others” (2014, 7). Thus, it is difficult, particularly in the 
moral domain, to support the claim that one’s belief processes are epistemically defective. There 
are also some arguments that might be counted as weaker versions of the irrelevant factors or 
process debunking arguments: these arguments just show that the belief of interest is the product 
                                                 
3 Singer (2005) advances a similar sort of argument. 
4 Greene might be supporting the claim that these factors are morally irrelevant with his point 
that our sensitivity to those factors is a product of evolution, which does not track the truth of 
moral propositions. If so, he is relying on a different, disputed assumption about evolution’s 
failure to track moral facts, or must supply a different argument to support the claim. (His 2014 
argument for the unreliability of automatic processes as a result of their evolutionary history 
offers a possibility). 
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of a process that we lack reason to think is tracking the truth (one could interpret some Street- 
and Joyce-type arguments this way).  
To the extent that the irrelevant factors argument and the process debunking argument 
rely on normative assumptions—for instance, about whether given factors are morally relevant—
they appear to be varieties of what Shafer-Landau (2013) calls the “knowledge-based 
genealogical critique.” Bedke (2014), too, identifies a class of debunking arguments like this. He 
distinguishes between two types of debunking arguments—those that proceed by establishing 
that our substantive moral beliefs are true by some sort of problematic coincidence, and those 
that undermine the status of subsets of beliefs on the grounds that they are influenced by 
“nefarious forces,” a judgment that is made by appealing to “privileged moral beliefs.”  
My arguments from inconsistent variability and inappropriately improbable belief rely on 
neither a premise about unreliability nor a premise about the lack of correlation between factor A 
and p. My argument might fall into a category that Shafer-Landau calls the “agnostic 
genealogical critique,” which seeks to show “without any assumption of where truth in a given 
domain lies,” that beliefs that result from some process are unlikely to be true (2012, 2). 
However, the arguments he discusses in this category rely on an assumption that there is no 
connection between the fact and the causal factor influencing beliefs. My argument avoids even 
this sort of assumption. One might think that the dysfunctional component argument that I 
advance falls into the category of knowledge-based genealogical critique, but in fact that 
argument uses a normative assumption only with the aim of identifying an inconsistency in 
moral claims—a tension between the idea that a certain set of moral beliefs are true and 
responsive to something we take to be morally relevant in the world, and the fact that the 
mechanism in our process that would have to track that property for the process to be truth 
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tracking is dysfunctional. Thus, the debunking arguments I formulate in this dissertation 
minimize assumptions about privileged moral beliefs and assumptions about which actions are 
right or wrong.  
This project also relates to what Pritchard (2005) has characterized as the 
“epistemological luck research program.” In the literature on knowledge and justification, many 
people have talked about the conditions under which luckiness prevents one’s beliefs from being 
justified or constituting knowledge. The question of luckiness is linked to the improbability of 
one’s beliefs. Not all situations in which one’s belief is improbable deprive one of knowledge. 
For instance, philosophers tend to think that if one obtains a rational faculty or some other 
reliable process improbably or only by luck, this is not an epistemic threat—e.g. no threat to 
one’s belief constituting knowledge or being justified. (See e.g. White’s 2010 comparison of coin 
flips in the head that determine belief and coin flips outside the head that determine whether one 
obtains a rational process for acquiring belief.) However, in my third chapter, I argue that under 
certain conditions, it being improbable that one would obtain a process that produces the beliefs 
one has on a topic undermines one’s reason for thinking that one tracks the truth. 
White observes that the epistemic problem posed by the causes of one’s beliefs is 
sometimes presented as a problem of luck, contingency, chanciness, and precariousness of one’s 
belief, and other times presented as a concern about inevitability and predictability of one’s 
belief. He says, “if both factors by themselves raise an epistemological problem then it would 
seem to be a matter of damned if you do and damned if you don’t” (579). Looking at a particular 
belief or set of beliefs, he is surely correct; we cannot say that the belief was both too probable 
and not probable enough. And if we were evaluating the epistemic status of all of our moral 
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beliefs together, only one of these features at a time could be a problem.5 If we are examining 
different moral propositions or classes of moral propositions, and we have different expectations 
about the probabilities of those different beliefs, or if we have different background assumption 
about how the truth value of those moral propositions varies over time, we can be worried about 
the luckiness of some beliefs and the inexorability of others, and vulnerability to inappropriate 
loss of some beliefs and inappropriate incorrigibility of others. Each of the debunking arguments 
I advance is a selective debunking argument that may be applied to just a subset of moral beliefs, 
and etiology will produce one set of epistemological problems for some of these moral beliefs 
and a different set for the others. 
                                                 
5 White explains the pull of these conflicting problems as due to the chanciness of one’s belief 
occurring earlier in the causal process and the fixity of one’s belief occurring once various 
unlikely causal factors are in place. He says, “Of course there is no inconsistency between these 
two factors, they just occur at different stages. It is a contingent matter which causes are in place 
that make it inevitable that you will believe this or that” (579). I do not think this is the right 
analysis of naïve worries about etiology nor the solution to those worries, but this does not 
matter for my point above. 
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2.0  TRUTH TRACKING AS THE MOST IMPORTANT EPISTEMIC PROPERTY IN 
THE MORAL DOMAIN 
In this dissertation I investigate what information about the causes of moral beliefs reveals about 
the epistemic status of those beliefs. There are several epistemic properties that might interest us: 
we could investigate whether moral beliefs constitute knowledge, whether they are justified or 
warranted, “safe,” the product of reliable processes, or whether they track the truth. Indeed, there 
are a variety of properties we might want our beliefs to have. I follow William Alston (2005) in 
thinking that in different contexts, these different epistemic desiderata may be more or less 
valuable (176). In this chapter I will argue that tracking the truth of certain propositions is the 
epistemic property that matters most for completion of any moral obligations that we may have, 
and, as a result, when we are investigating the epistemic status of beliefs in the moral domain, 
truth tracking is the most important property to examine. Further, I will argue that the degree to 
which we track the truth of a proposition is affected by the causes that influence whether we 
believe or do not believe the proposition and by the connection between those causes and the fact 
of the matter or the truth makers of the proposition. Consequently, to find out whether we track 
the truth, we should look into the causes that influence our beliefs. 
Much of the moral debunking literature has been presented in terms of truth tracking—
Sharon Street presented her Darwinian dilemma for the realist in terms of whether evolution is a 
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process that track truth and whether our moral beliefs track the truth.6 Several respondents to 
Street, such as Kahane, Enoch, and Brosnan, and others who have advanced evolutionary 
debunking arguments, such as Griffiths and Wilkins, have also used the language of truth 
tracking.7 Street says that she borrowed the language of truth-tracking from Nozick, but she and 
others tend to use the idea somewhat loosely, and do not invoke the specifics of Nozick’s 
account (Street 2006, 159 n.26). People have offered a number of characterizations of the 
epistemic problem posed by the influence of certain causes on moral beliefs. In this dissertation, 
I employ Roush’s account of truth tracking in terms of conditional probabilities. In the next 
chapter, I show how information about the causes of moral beliefs can be employed in three 
types of debunking arguments. For each of the debunking arguments that I described, the 
                                                 
6 For instance, she writes, “Barring such a coincidence, the only conclusion remaining is that 
many or most of our evaluative judgments are off track” (121–122), and “we may understand 
these evolutionary causes as having tracked the truth; we may understand the relation in question 
to be a tracking relation” (Street 2006, 125). 
7 For instance, Enoch writes, “On the other horn of the dilemma, the only realist-friendly 
explanation of the correlation seems to be a tracking account of some sort, according to which 
our normative judgments and the evolutionary pressures shaping them causally track the 
independent normative truths” (Enoch 2010, 426; my emphasis); Copp talks about beliefs as 
truth tracking: “Realists must either affirm or deny a thesis I will call the tracking thesis, the 
thesis that natural selection so affected our psychology that our moral beliefs tend to track the 
moral facts” (Copp 2008, 191). Griffiths and Wilkins also talk about evolution as a truth-tracking 
process. 
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epistemic problem can be understood in terms of truth tracking—as failure of adherence or 
sensitivity. Thinking about the problems posed by etiological debunking arguments as a matter 
of how information about causes influences our assessment of whether we track the truth of 
certain propositions helps clarify the relation between the different types of problems that 
etiological debunking arguments seem to pose.  
I will begin by presenting Sherrilyn Roush’s account of truth tracking, which I adopt, 
though I do not use her account of knowledge as truth tracking in this project. Then, I discuss the 
value of possessing true beliefs and lacking false beliefs about certain propositions over time in 
practical contexts where we have goals that we want to achieve. If it is valuable for 
accomplishing our goals to have true beliefs and lack false beliefs about these propositions over 
some duration, I argue, it is also valuable to track the truth of these propositions over that time 
period. I extend these points into the moral context, adopting the assumption that we have the 
goal of accomplishing any moral obligations we may have. I consider several objections, and 
then I compare the value of truth tracking in practical contexts with some of the other epistemic 
properties that we might like our beliefs to have. Finally, I discuss the relationship between truth 
tracking and the causes of our beliefs and argue that information about the causes of beliefs can 
shed light on whether those beliefs track the truth. 
2.1 ROUSH’S ACCOUNT OF TRUTH TRACKING 
In Tracking Truth, Roush provides a truth tracking account of knowledge (2005). She modifies 
Robert Nozick’s (1981) counterfactual truth tracking account of knowledge by presenting the 
conditions for truth tracking as conditional probabilities and adding a clause that preserves 
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closure.8 On her account, an agent tracks the truth of a proposition if and only if (1) the 
probability that the agent does not believe p conditional on p being false meets some high 
threshold and (2) the probability that the agent believes p conditional on p being true meets some 
high threshold. Condition (1) is known as the sensitivity condition. Condition (2) is known as the 
adherence condition. An agent can meet the adherence condition for some proposition but fail to 
meet the sensitivity condition for that proposition, and vice versa. On Roush’s account it is 
sufficient for the agent to know p if the agent believes p, p is true, and the agent tracks the truth 
of p. To know in this way is to know by tracking the truth of p.9  
                                                 
8 The simplest version of Nozick’s original account of knowledge said that a subject S knows 
that p if and only if (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p, (3) if p were not true, S would not believe 
that p, and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p (Nozick 1981, 172-178). Conditions (3) and 
(4) are the truth tracking conditions. They are subjunctive conditionals that can be understood in 
possible worlds semantics as follows: (3) in the closest possible world where p is not true, S does 
not believe that p, and (4) in the closest possible world (or in a few of the closest possible 
worlds) where p is true, S believes that p. Nozick dealt with various counterexamples by 
modifying (3) and (4) so that they were fixed to a particular method (e.g. “(3) If p were not true 
and S were to use [method] M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, then S wouldn’t believe, 
via M, that p” (179). One consequence of Nozick’s account was that it denied that knowledge is 
closed under known entailment. 
9 On Roush’s account, the agent may alternately know that p by known implication, if and only if 
the following conditions hold: p is true, the agent believes that p, and the agent knows via 
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Although it is not part of her account of knowledge, Roush also discusses the property of 
safety, which others have suggested may be a necessary condition for knowledge (Sosa 1996, 
2000). Roush contrasts safety with sensitivity in particular, arguing that sensitivity is a more 
valuable epistemic property for a variety of reasons. Like sensitivity and adherence, safety was 
originally introduced as a counterfactual condition, but Roush presents it as the conditional 
probability that p is true given that the agent believes p; for a belief to be safe this probability 
should meet some high threshold.10 There is a fourth epistemic property that one might consider 
along with sensitivity, adherence, and safety. This property, which I will refer to as safety 
counterpart, is a high probability that p is false given that the agent does not believe p. This 
epistemic property is not of much interest for questions related to knowledge, but it may yet be a 
desirable epistemic property, and sensitivity, safety, adherence, and safety counterpart are 
interdefined, so its existence is worth noting.  
Roush trades counterfactuals for conditional probabilities in part because Nozick’s 
counterfactuals required only that the subject would believe p in one or a few closest possible 
worlds where p is true (in the adherence condition) or would not believe p in one or a few closest 
possible worlds where p is false (in the sensitivity condition) (28). Considering what the subject 
would believe in only one or a few nearby worlds makes his account of knowledge too weak, 
producing a cluster of counterexamples. More importantly for my purposes, if we are interested 
                                                                                                                                                             
tracking some set of propositions that imply p, and the agent knows that this set of propositions 
implies p. 
10 Sosa presented safety as the following condition: If S were to believe p, p would be true (1999, 
146). Or, in all nearby worlds where S believes p (via method M), p is true. 
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in whether a subject is likely to believe a proposition under the range of circumstances that the 
subject may face in the course of goal completion, it is not adequate to consider only how the 
subject’s attitude would vary given one or a few variations in the circumstances. Roush observes 
that it may be possible to develop a theory of subjunctive counterfactuals that requires for their 
evaluation that one consider more worlds than just the closest or a few of the closest worlds. 
However, no such theory is currently available. By contrast, assessing the adherence and 
sensitivity conditions in the form of Roush’s conditional probabilities naturally involves 
examining a variety of ways the world might have been different (28-29).  
2.2 THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF, ABSENCE OF FALSE BELIEF, 
AND TRUTH TRACKING 
Roush offers two lines of argument in support of the claim that truth tracking is valuable. First, 
when true belief (and absence of false belief) is useful, then truth tracking is valuable, because 
meeting each of the truth tracking conditions for some proposition means that the probability is 
high that we will have a true belief and lack a false belief in the future and in different contexts. 
This helps us do things; it gives us power to control the world (26). Second, Roush argues that 
truth tracking may be intrinsically valuable. In the moral domain, where we are concerned with 
completing any obligations we might have, what should interest us is the practical value of true 
belief and truth tracking—the value of each of these for accomplishing obligations. So, I will set 
aside questions about the intrinsic value of both true beliefs and truth tracking. 
In this section, I will discuss the practical value of true belief and absence of false belief 
about certain propositions that is conferred by having some goal. For an agent with a goal, there 
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is a set of propositions with the feature that believing a proposition in this set when that 
proposition is true and lacking a belief in it when it is false increases the agent’s chances of 
accomplishing her goal. In the next section I will argue that when possession of true belief and 
absence of false belief is valuable for practical reasons, this makes truth tracking a valuable 
epistemic property to have. Then I will apply these points to contexts in which one has 
specifically moral goals.  
I will introduce some shorthand to talk more easily about the idea that it is useful to have 
true beliefs and to lack false beliefs about certain propositions. An agent’s attitude about a 
proposition matches the truth value of the proposition if it is the case that (1) p is true and the 
agent believes p, or if it is the case that (2) p is false and the agent does not believe p.11 We can 
call the first situation positive matching, and the second, negative matching. So, for the 
proposition “There’s a hummingbird at the window,” the agent’s attitude matches this 
proposition if either of these two holds: (1) there is in fact a hummingbird at the window and the 
agent believes it, or (2) there is no hummingbird at the window, and the agent does not believe 
that there is, whether because the agent has no belief on the subject or believes that there is no 
hummingbird at the window. So, my first claim is that for any agent with a goal, there is a set of 
propositions with the feature that the agent’s possession of attitudes that match the truth value of 
                                                 
11 Matching in this sense should be distinguished from its use in a correspondence theory of truth 
on which a proposition is true if it matches the world. My thesis is independent of one’s theory 
of truth. I should note that Roush appears to use the term “matching” in this way a few times in 
her (2006). 
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those propositions increases the agent’s chances of completing the goal.12  
For instance, suppose that the agent’s goal is to drink a cup of coffee within the next 
fifteen minutes. There are a number of propositions such that if the agent’s attitude about those 
propositions matches their truth value, against some set of ordinary background beliefs, this 
increases the agent’s chances of completing his goal. These might include: (a) that the agent is at 
home, with no coffee shops nearby; (b) that there is a coffee maker on the kitchen counter; (c) 
that coffee is stored on the top shelf; (d) that all the coffee mugs are dirty, etc. If it is false that 
the coffee is stored on the top shelf, it would be better for the agent to lack a belief in this 
proposition than to believe it. Likewise, it would be better for the agent to believe that the coffee 
maker is on the counter than not believe it, if the coffee maker is indeed on the counter.  
For some of these propositions it is valuable to have an attitude about them that matches 
their truth value during specific times over the course of goal completion. If it is true that all the 
coffee mugs are dirty, it is useful for the agent to believe this while he still has time to wash a 
mug—say, up to fourteen minutes in, to leave him one minute to wash the mug. Up to fourteen 
minutes in, it is useful for him to have an attitude about the proposition expressed by the 
sentence that “all the coffee mugs are dirty” that matches the truth value of that proposition. It 
would be best, with regard to any of these propositions, for the agent to have attitudes that 
matched their truth values at all the times that mattered for goal completion.  
To give another example—a classic case in which philosophers have discussed the 
practical value of true belief is the conversation between Socrates and Meno about the road to 
                                                 
12 It is nonstandard to refer to withholding belief as an attitude, but there is no natural alternative 
to refer to these three relationships between S and p. 
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Larissa. We can understand getting to Larissa to be the goal or the relevant action in this case. 
We can imagine some relevant propositions, such as “The road I am on is the road to Larissa” 
and “To get to Larissa, if I am at a fork, I should take the lefthand path.” One’s attitudes about 
these propositions at various times would affect one’s chances of reaching Larissa. It would be 
ideal to have attitudes that match the truth value of the first proposition over the course of the 
entire trip. For the second proposition, it would probably be sufficient to have attitudes matching 
the truth value of this proposition only on those occasions when one finds oneself at a fork.  
These are cases of goals—coffee making and traveling to a destination—from everyday 
life. But the point extends to other goals, such as goals in science, engineering, politics, 
economics, etc., and, as I will discuss in section 4, to goals in the moral domain. So, for each 
goal there is a set of propositions such that having attitudes about those propositions that match 
their truth value (at the right times) increases the agent’s chances of goal completion. I will refer 
to this set of propositions as “relevant propositions.” 
Of course, there are complications. For some goals there may be disjunctions of 
propositions or of sets of propositions, such that possessing attitudes that matched the truth 
values of all the propositions in any one of those sets would make the agent more likely to 
complete the goal. In fact, this complexity will probably apply in most cases. For instance, if 
there were three equally good recipes for making oatmeal cookies, a person would be equally 
well off if he had matching attitudes about what to do at each step for any one of these recipes. In 
such a case, each set of propositions would be relevant for determining the agent’s probability of 
goal completion. Furthermore, in some cases there will be a set of propositions, such that if the 
agent has attitudes that match the truth value of all the propositions in that set, the agent’s 
chances of goal completion increase, but if the agent has attitudes that match the truth value of 
 21 
only some of the propositions, then there is no (or little) influence on the chances of goal 
completion. For instance, in the coffee case, if the agent has attitudes that match propositions (a)-
(d) above but the agent has no attitudes that match the truth values of propositions related to 
operating the coffee maker, the fact that the agent matches propositions (a)-(d) does little to 
increase the agent’s chances of goal completion. Nonetheless, I think for a given goal we will 
usually be able to generate a list of propositions or sets of propositions with the feature that 
matching makes a significant difference to one’s chances of goal completion among many or the 
most common sets of background beliefs. I will address some of the challenges associated with 
this task in section 6.  
When one sets out to accomplish a goal, there is some probability that one’s attitudes 
about each of the relevant propositions will match the truth values of the propositions at the 
relevant times. Since having attitudes that match the truth values of these propositions increase 
one’s chances of goal completion, a higher probability of matching means a higher probability of 
goal completion. As a result, when the agent sets out to accomplish the goal, it would be best if 
the probability is high that the agent’s attitudes regarding the relevant propositions match the 
truth values of those propositions at all the relevant times: the agent would surely want this 
probability to be high, and, if it were an option, the agent would want to increase this probability. 
So, in cases where it is pragmatically valuable to possess attitudes that match the truth value of a 
proposition, it is also (instrumentally) valuable for the agent to have a high probability of 
matching when she sets out to accomplish her goal. 
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2.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MATCHING, TRUTH TRACKING, AND 
SAFETY, AND HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBABILITY OF MATCHING 
As described above, the agent’s attitude about a proposition, p, matches the truth value of p if 
either (1) the agent believes p and p is true (positive matching) or (2) the agent does not believe p 
and p is false (negative matching). To put it formally, let Bp stand for the event that the agent 
believes that p, and M for the event that the agent’s attitude matches the truth value of p. Then, 
we can write the definition of matching as follows: 
Pr(M) = Pr[(Bp&p)v(~Bp&~p)]. 
Bp&p and ~Bp&~p are mutually exclusive, so this definition implies: 
Pr(M) =  Pr(Bp&p) + Pr(~Bp&~p)  (1) 
Pr(M) = Pr(p&Bp) + Pr(~p&~Bp)  (2) 
Applying the definition of conditional probability to each term on the right hand side of 
Eq. (1), we get 
Pr(M) = Pr(Bp|p)Pr(p) + Pr(~Bp|~p)Pr(~p). (3) 
Note that Pr(Bp|p) is adherence and Pr(~Bp|~p) is sensitivity.  
Now, if we apply the definition of conditional probability to Eq. (2), we get 
Pr(M) = Pr(p|Bp)Pr(Bp) + Pr(~p|~Bp)Pr(~Bp)  (4) 
where Pr(p|Bp) is safety and Pr(~p|~Bp) is safety counterpart. 
Consequently, one may investigate the probability of matching in a variety of ways, 
depending on the information available. If we already know Pr(Bp&p) and Pr(~Bp&~p), we 
need not use Eq. (3) or (4). If we do not know these probabilities, we can use Eq. (3) or (4). If we 
are more likely to have information about Pr(p), adherence, and sensitivity we can use Eq. (3); if 
we are more likely to have information about Pr(Bp), safety, and safety counterpart, we can use 
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Eq. (4). 
Eq. (3) suggests that Pr(M) depends on both adherence and sensitivity just in case 0 < 
Pr(p) < 1. Otherwise, one of the terms on the right hand side of Eq. (3) is zero, and Pr(M) 
depends only on adherence or sensitivity. Eq. (4) suggests that Pr(M) depends on both safety and 
safety counterpart just in case 0 < Pr(Bp) < 1. Otherwise, one of the terms on the right hand side 
of Eq. (4) is zero, and Pr(M) depends only on safety or safety counterpart. 








[Safety counterpart]  
Note that adherence and sensitivity are defined in terms of safety and safety counterpart, 
and, in turn, safety and safety counterpart are defined in terms of adherence and sensitivity.13 
Importantly, this means that adherence, sensitivity, safety, and safety counterpart are closely 
                                                 
13 For instance, adherence = safety x Pr(Bp) / (safety x Pr(Bp) + Pr(1-safety counterpart) x 
Pr(~Bp)). 
 24 
connected. If one fixes Pr(Bp), Pr(p), and two of these four conditional probabilities, one can 
determine the two remaining conditional probabilities. 
Eq. (3) suggests that if Pr(p) = 1, then Pr(M) is determined by adherence. But if Pr(p) = 1, 
then Pr(p|Bp) = 1 and Pr(~p|~Bp) = 0. Adherence is thus determined by Pr(Bp) alone, and so is 
Pr(M). Hence, if Pr(p) = 1, we should be interested only in Pr(Bp). (Also, note that if Pr(p) = 1, 
Pr(~Bp|~p) is undefined). Likewise, Eq. (3) suggests that if Pr(~p) = 1, then Pr(M) is determined 
by sensitivity. But if Pr(~p) = 1, then Pr(p|Bp) = 0 and Pr(~p|~Bp) = 1. Sensitivity is thus 
determined by Pr(~Bp) alone, and so is Pr(M). Hence, if Pr(~p) = 1, we should be interested only 
in Pr(~Bp). 
Similarly, suppose there were some propositions that we were bound to believe: Pr(Bp) = 
1. Then Eq. (4) suggests that Pr(M) is determined by safety. But if Pr(Bp) = 1, then Pr(Bp|p) = 1 
and Pr(~Bp|~p) = 0. Safety is thus determined by Pr(p) alone, and so is Pr(M). Hence, if Pr(Bp) 
= 1, we should be interested only in Pr(p). Also, suppose there were some propositions that we 
were bound not to believe: Pr(~Bp) = 1. Then Eq. (4) suggests that Pr(M) is determined by the 
safety counterpart. But if Pr(~Bp) = 1, then Pr(Bp|p) = 0 and Pr(~Bp|~p) = 1. The safety 
counterpart is thus determined by Pr(~p) alone, and so is Pr(M). Hence, if Pr(~Bp) = 1, we 
should be interested only in Pr(~p). 
2.4 THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF MATCHING AND TRUTH TRACKING IN THE 
MORAL CONTEXT  
The argument about the pragmatic value of matching and tracking certain propositions for the 
purposes of completing goals can be extended to the moral context. For the purposes of 
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accomplishing moral goals, there are propositions with the feature that matching those 
propositions increases the agent’s chances of completing the moral goal. For instance, very 
broadly, a person might have the goal of accomplishing his moral obligations—in some 
particular context, or over the course of his life. Or a person might have the goal of becoming a 
virtuous person, or exhibiting a particular virtue, such as bravery. For the purposes of 
accomplishing these goals, there are sets of propositions—including certain moral 
propositions—with the feature that if the person has a matching attitude about these propositions, 
this increases the chances that the person will accomplish his goal. Among the set of propositions 
relevant for any given moral goal will be certain moral propositions: the proposition that one has 
the some moral obligation, propositions about the nature of the moral obligation and means for 
achieving it, propositions about which features of a situation are morally relevant, and (possibly) 
metaethical propositions. As the person sets out to accomplish the goal, the person will want to 
have a high probability of matching these propositions—it will be better for the person to be in a 
position where he has a high probability of matching these propositions.14  
For instance, suppose an agent has the goal of acting properly toward strangers. The 
agent is sitting on a bus and another person is standing in front of her. Suppose that the fact of 
                                                 
14 It may be that it would be just as good not to have matching attitudes about the truth of the 
proposition but instead matching pro- and anti-attitudes at the appropriate times or simply 
behaviors that match one’s obligations. Provided that there are appropriate and inappropriate 
pro- and anti-attitudes and behaviors, it would then still be possible for one to track or fail to 
track something even if it is not truth. This might mean that my account could be adapted to 
apply to some non-cognitivist views. I plan to explore this possibility in the future. 
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the matter is that to act properly toward strangers, the agent should give up her seat to the 
stranger in front of her. The agent will be more likely to accomplish her goal in this situation if 
she has a high probability of matching certain propositions over the course of the bus ride. It is 
better for the agent if she has a habit of staying attuned to her surroundings in a way that makes it 
likely that she will acquire and maintain matching attitudes about the (nonmoral) proposition that 
there is someone standing in front of her. The agent will also be more likely to achieve her goal 
if she can form matching attitudes about (nonmoral) propositions related to the frailty level of the 
person in front of her. Matching attitudes about that sort of proposition, though, will only 
increase her chances of goal completion if she also has a matching attitude about the relevance of 
frailty to the question of how to act properly to strangers. Consider the moral proposition that 
when one is sitting on a crowded bus and a more frail person is standing, the way to act properly 
to strangers is to give up one’s seat. It will increase the agent’s chances of completing her goal of 
acting properly toward strangers if she is likely to believe this moral proposition, given that the 
proposition is true. Similarly, consider the moral proposition that the proper treatment of 
strangers is independent of the commands of the bus driver. The agent will be better off if she is 
likely to match the truth value of this proposition. If the agent is inclined to believe that the 
proper treatment of strangers is independent of the commands of the bus driver when this 
proposition is true, she will be more likely to complete her obligation. For example, if the bus 
driver falsely instructed her that frailty is morally irrelevant on his bus, she will be more likely to 
reject his claims. 
Before moving on, I want to discuss what it means for my account if some moral 
propositions relevant for goal completion are necessarily true. Accounts of knowledge that 
employ sensitivity and adherence or safety have had trouble dealing with necessary propositions. 
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There are many necessary propositions that people are thought to know. Yet sensitivity is 
undefined in the cases of propositions that are necessarily true, as noted above, and so if one 
makes sensitivity a necessary condition for knowledge, true beliefs in necessary propositions will 
not count as knowledge. The truth tracking theorist could make an exception for necessary 
propositions, and say that beliefs in necessary propositions only need to meet the adherence 
condition to count as knowledge. However, this will result in some cases of belief in necessary 
propositions that epistemologists think are not knowledge getting counted as knowledge. For 
instance, suppose one has a belief in a necessary proposition. If one has a high probability of 
believing the necessary proposition solely because a benevolent demon ensures one’s belief, one 
will have a high degree of adherence. But many epistemologists will not count this as a case of 
knowledge. Similarly, many epistemologists think that safety is fulfilled too easily in cases of 
necessary propositions—essentially, on an account where a true belief’s safety suffices for 
knowledge, one knows a necessary proposition whenever one believes it, which will lead us to 
categorize too many cases of true belief as knowledge. 
However, because what motivates this project is concern for accomplishing any 
obligations we might have, and because, as I have argued, having certain matching attitudes will 
likely make a substantial difference in whether we do this, I am not pursuing an account of 
knowledge here, nor assessing whether we have moral knowledge. For my task, the possibility 
that some moral propositions are necessary propositions pose no special problem. I am 
investigating the probability that we will match various moral propositions relevant for our moral 
goals. I noted earlier that if Pr(p) = 1, as in the case of necessary truths, our probability of 
matching is determined solely by adherence, which in turn is determined solely by Pr(Bp). If for 
an agent with a goal, possession of attitudes that match the truth value of certain necessary 
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propositions increases the agent’s chances of goal completion, this just means that the agent will 
be better off if she has a high Pr(Bp) during the time relevant for goal completion. That a moral 
proposition is necessary does not undermine the possibility that it is valuable for the agent to 
have attitudes that match the truth value of the proposition, and to have a high probability of 
matching. 
Admittedly, if all the moral propositions that are relevant for goal completion are 
necessary, this will mean that none of the other probabilities discussed earlier—Pr(p), adherence, 
sensitivity, safety, and safety counterpart—matter for our chances of matching relevant moral 
propositions. But there are some moral propositions relevant for goal completion that are not 
necessary truths, and so these other probabilities do play a role in determining our chances of 
matching relevant propositions, and, as a result, they bear investigating.  
The relevant contingent moral propositions are moral propositions such as those 
expressed by the following sentences: (1) Barack Obama should give some money to a charity 
today; or (2) Barack Obama should give some money to Oxfam this year. Suppose (1) expresses 
this proposition: Barack Obama should give some money to a charity on May 16, 2013. For 
evaluating the truth of this proposition, the only worlds that are relevant are those in which 
Barack Obama exist, it is May 16, 2013, and Obama is capable of giving to a charity. Now, 
within this set of worlds, many things vary, including facts about Obama and facts about 
charities. In some worlds Obama would suffer greatly if he gave to a charity; in some worlds, all 
charities are ineffective. Now, suppose (2) expresses the proposition that Obama should give 
some money to Oxfam in 2013. The relevant worlds would be those where Obama exist, Oxfam 
exists, it is 2013, and Obama is capable of giving some money to Oxfam. Within these worlds, 
facts about Obama and facts about Oxfam would vary across worlds. In some worlds, Oxfam 
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might do more bad than good. 
Suppose our goal is to complete our moral obligations.15 Many of the propositions that 
will increase our chances of completing this goal have to do with what our obligations are or 
what the obligation of some set of people is at some time or under some circumstances. The 
person or set of people that appear in the proposition and the time or the set of circumstances that 
appear in the proposition restrict which worlds are relevant. But within the set of relevant worlds, 
the proposition will be true in some and false in others, depending on facts that vary between 
worlds. Suppose Jose finds himself seated on a bus at time T, and thinks to himself that he should 
give up his seat to someone else. This proposition is contingent: In some worlds at T, such as 
worlds where everyone on the bus is more frail than Jose, Jose’s obligation will be give up his 
seat on a bus; in other worlds at T, such as worlds where the only others on the bus are husky 
football players, Jose’s obligation would be to retain his seat on the bus. (This example assumes 
that frailty is morally relevant). Consequently, it would be valuable for Jose to have a high 
degree of sensitivity as well as adherence with regard to this proposition. For instance, it would 
be good if Jose would have acquired this belief if everyone around him were frail, and if he 
would have not held this belief if he were surrounded by football players.  
Is there something tricky going on here when I appeal to propositions like the proposition 
that I should not give up my seat to this person? Roush has used a similar sort of proposition as 
an example of a (nonmoral) proposition to which truth tracking conditions are applied. She talks 
about the proposition that there is a tiger in front of a subject (270), noting that this could be true 
                                                 
15 If we have no moral obligations, then this goal is not possible, which means my account 
should not be applied to this case. 
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or false: “The truth value of p may change; the tiger may be gone today but back tomorrow” 
(Roush “Value of knowledge,” 259).  In some worlds, there is a tiger in the vicinity of the agent 
in question; in other worlds, there is no tiger in the vicinity of the agent in question. Similar 
change in truth value may occur in the bus case. In some possible worlds in which the agent in 
question is sitting on the bus, it is true that the agent should give up her seat to the person in front 
of her; in other worlds it is false. Supposing, then, that there are contingent moral propositions 
with the feature that matching those propositions increases our chances of goal completion, then 
Pr(Bp) will not be the only probability that matters for our chances of matching; sensitivity, 
adherence, safety, safety counterpart and Pr(p) may also be relevant.  
2.5 PRELIMINARY WORRIES 
To clarify how my account is meant to work, I will address some preliminary worries about the 
claim that for any given goal there is a set of propositions such that if the agent has attitudes 
toward these propositions that match their truth value, this makes some significant difference to 
goal completion. 
First, one might wonder whether for any given goal there might be a vast number of 
potentially relevant propositions. As a result, one might ask how feasible it is to identify the 
relevant propositions with the feature that matching them would have a significant positive effect 
on one’s chances of goal completion (against some set of background beliefs), and how one 
would go about doing this. I acknowledge the possibility that a vast number of propositions may 
be relevant for a goal, but I think that for each goal we can find some propositions that are 
clearly more relevant than others and some propositions that are clearly less relevant. For 
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example, in the coffee case, propositions about very improbable events will be correspondingly 
less relevant for the chances of goal completion. Propositions about an earthquake knocking all 
the coffee onto the floor, for instance, will not be terribly important to track. In other cases, when 
one’s goal has to do with certain improbable events, propositions about those improbable events 
will be clearly relevant. For instance, if one’s goal is to construct a skyscraper that will withstand 
earthquakes, it will important to track propositions about the frequency of earthquakes and 
building methods effective for preventing damage resulting from these improbable events. So, 
one thing to say is that some of the propositions will be more important to match than others. 
There is no general rule for how one would go about the task of identifying relevant propositions 
for all goals. The most relevant propositions for bridge building differ from the most relevant 
propositions for getting through the day. However, in certain domains there may be propositions 
that are usually relevant for goals in that domain. In engineering, it is surely valuable to have 
matching attitudes about sets of mathematical propositions and principles from physics. 
Similarly, in the domain of morality it may be generally useful to match certain propositions, 
such as propositions about moral realism, authority independence, truth makers of moral rules, 
etc. Other propositions will likely be relevant in most cases, such logical and basic mathematical 
propositions. At the same time, many of these propositions that are generally valuable to track 
will not bear investigating—e.g. because we are already confident that the person in question 
tracks those facts.   
To expand on the moral case, suppose that we have the moral goal to complete any 
obligations that we might have. What propositions are relevant for this goal, in the sense that 
having an attitude about this proposition that matches increases ones chances of goal 
completion? It is harder to determine which propositions are relevant if we do not make 
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assumptions about the nature of our moral obligations, but I suggest that generally it is good to 
match propositions that have to do with the content of one’s moral obligations and the means for 
achieving them. It may also be good to match metaethical propositions about the nature of 
obligations (such as what makes moral propositions true) and propositions about the reasons an 
action ought to be done in a particular case. For instance, suppose that an egoist believes (p) he 
ought to refrain from killing his friend in some circumstance—suppose this is true, that this is his 
obligation in that circumstance—and he believes (q) he should do this because he would face 
punishment otherwise—which is false; this is not the reason he should abstain from killing. His 
non-egoist peer possesses the first belief but not the second; the non-egoist believes (p) he should 
not kill his friend in the relevant circumstances and (r) p because murder is always wrong. Each 
has a true belief about his obligation: he should not kill his friend in these circumstances. But the 
egoist would be better off if he lacked his false belief in q and possessed a true belief in r. The 
egoist does not track the truth of this proposition as well as the non-egoist, because if the 
situation were slightly different such that the egoist would not be punished if he killed his friend, 
the egoist would no longer believe p. By contrast, the non-egoist would retain his belief that p. 
Second, one might worry that one’s attitudes about propositions might not make a 
significant difference to one’s chances of goal completion in comparison with other things in the 
world, such as physical facts, the truth value of the propositions themselves, etc. For instance, 
one’s chances of making coffee in the next fifteen minutes are more influenced by whether there 
is coffee close enough that one could access it in fifteen minutes than by whether one has a 
matching attitude about whether there is coffee close by—if there is no coffee nearby, it hardly 
matters what attitude one has about whether any coffee is accessible. This raises the worry that 
perhaps to assess our chances of goal completion, we should look at factors other than our 
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attitudes about propositions and whether they match.  
I have three things to say about this. First, in some cases, whether our attitudes match 
certain propositions clearly matters a great deal. For instance, when our goal is to build a stable 
bridge, our chances are heavily influenced by our attitudes about propositions. Second, even if 
matching propositions has just a small influence over our chances of goal completion, we will 
still want to investigate our chances of matching in cases where our attitudes are the only things 
that we have control over. Third, in some of the cases in which any contributions matching 
attitudes make are swamped by other factors, this is because outside factors make goal 
completion impossible to begin with. I mean to exclude these cases, where there is actually no 
chance of goal completion, from my story. When I talk about a goal, I am talking about a task 
that it is possible for the agent to complete.   
2.6 OBJECTIONS 
Some have challenged the claim that possession of true belief is generally pragmatically 
valuable. This point is not exactly a challenge to my thesis, which is not that matching is 
generally pragmatically valuable but that for any given goal there are some propositions such 
that it is pragmatically valuable to have attitudes that match the truth values of those 
propositions. The cases offered by proponents of this challenge raise the worry, though, that 
whether it is valuable to possess attitudes that match the truth value of a particular proposition 
may depend significantly on context, and so determining whether it would be valuable to possess 
attitudes that match the truth value of some proposition may be somewhat more difficult than 
one might have thought.  
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There are certainly some propositions, in some contexts, where it would be better for goal 
achievement to have an attitude that does not match the truth value of the proposition—it would 
be better to lack belief in the proposition when it is true or to believe the proposition when it is 
false. Stich offers an example of a situation in which it would be better to lack a true belief about 
a certain proposition: Harry believes his flight leaves at 7:45 a.m.; he gets on the plane, it 
crashes, and he dies. For this case, we might assume that Harry’s goal is survival over the course 
of the day. Adding a true belief to the agent’s body of beliefs worsens his chances of survival. By 
contrast, had he falsely believed that the plane left at 8:45, he would have avoided the crash and 
lived (Stich 1990, 123). Stich concludes that more true beliefs are not always better than fewer, 
and, we can add, sometimes it is better to possess a false belief in a proposition than not. This is 
surely true. 
Background beliefs and incomplete sets of beliefs seem to contribute a great deal to 
whether one has a problem in cases like the one Stich raises. Here Harry has an incomplete set of 
beliefs about the situation, and some of his other beliefs are false, as Stich notes. If Harry had the 
true belief that the flight leaves at 7:45, but also the true belief that the plane would crash, he 
would not have a problem. The fact that it is better not to match the proposition about the time 
the plane leaves only comes about because Harry fails to match this other proposition, that the 
plane is going to crash. For my purposes, this case just underlines the fact that sometimes 
whether it is valuable to match a proposition is affected by one’s attitudes about certain other 
propositions. If Harry matches the proposition that the plane is going to crash, then it is good to 
match certain propositions; if he does not match this key proposition, then it will be better to fail 
to match certain of these propositions. These sorts of complications will make it trickier to 
identify the propositions with the feature that matching makes a significant positive difference to 
 35 
the chances of goal completion. It might be necessary to look instead for the propositions with 
the feature that matching makes a significant positive difference to the chances of goal 
completion against a certain background of other beliefs.  
Furthermore, possession of the false belief that the flight leaves at 8:45 would allow 
Harry to achieve his goal in the particular case described, but goal achievement here would 
happen in a sense by accident, because the case described is also very improbable. Normally, it 
would be advantageous for Harry to having a matching attitude about the proposition that his 
flight leaves at a particular time. After the fact, we can say in this case that it would have been 
better for Harry’s chances of goal completion if he had not match the proposition that the flight 
leaves at 8:45. But beforehand, because it is improbable that the plane will crash, what is best for 
Harry’s chances of goal completion is to match this proposition: to not believe that the flight 
leaves at 8:45, and to have the true belief that the flight leaves at 7:45.  
One might also ask whether, for a proposition whose matching seems likely affect our 
chances of goal completion, it is so critical that we believe that specific proposition when it is 
true and lack belief in it when it is false, or whether we could do just as well, or nearly as well, 
by believing a similar (but strictly false) proposition q when p is true and lacking belief in p and 
propositions similar to p, such as q, when p is false. Practically, this might mean that when we 
find a proposition that we suspect would make a difference to goal completion, and we find that 
we have a low probability of matching this proposition, we might also want to check whether 
there are similar propositions that we tend to believe and disbelieve at the relevant times. If so, in 
these cases, failure to match p will not be so terrible for our chances of goal completion. For 
instance, in the coffee case, it might be useful for the agent to have an attitude that matches the 
true proposition (p) that there is coffee stored in the cupboard. Perhaps the agent does not match 
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this proposition, because he does not realize that the wooden box on the wall is a cupboard and 
instead thinks it is a bookshelf, but whenever p is true he tends to believe the false proposition 
(q) that there is coffee stored in the bookshelf on the wall. Believing q when p is true and not 
believing q when p is false would presumably be good enough for the purposes of accomplishing 
his goal of drinking coffee in the next fifteen minutes. So, if I conclude that our chances of 
completing some moral goal are compromised by the fact that we do not appear to track some 
proposition seemed to be relevant for goal completion, one might object by identifying 
propositions similar to p that we appear to “track” in place of p, and contending that we are not 
as badly off as I have claimed. This is an important worry, and it will have to be taken into 
consideration when identifying the propositions that are relevant for one’s moral goal.  
2.7 OTHER EPISTEMIC PROPERTIES 
One might ask whether various other epistemic properties are more pragmatically valuable than 
(or at least as pragmatically valuable as) the property of having a high probability of matching a 
proposition. Perhaps there are other epistemic desiderata that it would be better to investigate for 
the purposes of assessing our epistemic situation in relation to goal completion. I will modify 
Alston’s helpful categorization of epistemic desiderata as a way to organize the desiderata that 
might comprise an alternative to high probability of matching (Alston 2005). First, there is the 
property of a belief being true. Second, there are properties that are “truth-conducive.” 
Sensitivity, adherence, and safety fit into this category. We can also count the following 
properties of belief as falling into this category: being supported by adequate evidence, being the 
product of a reliable process, being the product of properly functioning cognitive processes, and 
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being the product of exertion of an intellectual virtue. These properties fall into this category to 
the extent that they render the belief likely to be true. Third, there are properties that Alston 
designates as deontological features of belief. We can put the properties of being justified and 
known into a fourth category—these are properties whose nature is highly disputed. A fifth 
category consists of properties of systems of beliefs, such as coherence.  
Respect for the value of truth does not compete with my argument for the value of 
matching and the probability of matching; it is part of my story, since one matches a proposition 
either when one has a true belief about the proposition or when one lacks a false belief about it. It 
is the value of matching a proposition that makes a high probability of matching valuable. I have 
argued that inasmuch as we are interested in true beliefs or matching, we will be interested in the 
probability of matching, and thus in the properties of sensitivity, adherence, and safety. To assess 
our epistemic position for the purposes of assessing and improving chances of goal completion, 
though, we cannot just look at truth or matching alone. Because it would be useful for us to 
match a proposition in the future, we are better off in current position if we have a high 
probability of matching at those future moments than if we do not. So, although in the end we 
will either match the proposition or not at each of the relevant moments, we do not go about 
investigating our epistemic position just by assessing whether we match at certain moments (the 
only moments we’d be able to do this for would be current and past moments); we also have to 
assess whether we are likely to match at relevant moments in the future.  
Truth conducive properties are valuable because they increase the probability that one’s 
attitude about a proposition matches the truth value of that proposition. For instance, if a belief is 
the product of a reliable process, this means that the belief is likely to be true. In other words, 
given that you believe p via this reliable process, the probability of p is high (assuming that the 
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process in question is the only way that you would have acquired the belief). The properties of 
being supported by adequate evidence, being the product of properly functioning cognitive 
processes, and being the product of exertion of an intellectual virtue, too, are pragmatically 
valuable in my view because they increase the probability of matching. So, we can use 
information about the evidence for a belief, the reliability or proper functioning of the process 
from which it came, or whether its production involved the exertion of a virtue, to gauge how 
likely one is to match that proposition. But these properties do not confer pragmatic value apart 
from inasmuch as they increase the probability of matching.16 
Deontological features of belief are usually claimed to contribute non-instrumental value. 
For instance, that a belief is held permissibly, that it is formed and held responsibly, that its 
origins do “not contain violations of intellectual obligations” (Alston 2005, 45) are meant to be 
intrinsically valuable or at least not valuable for the purposes of goal completion. So, if we 
wanted to investigate our epistemic status not with regard to goal completion but something else, 
or if we wanted to investigate the non-pragmatic value of our beliefs, we might look at these 
properties. But since my task has to do with the pragmatic value of beliefs, these properties, if 
their value is not pragmatic, are not competitors with the property of having a high chance of 
matching. 
I have been arguing for the value of truth tracking and high probability of matching 
without weighing in on its relation to knowledge, but of course, the conditions of sensitivity, 
adherence, and safety were introduced as conditions for knowledge. A natural question is the 
following: to assess our chances of completing our moral goals, why not investigate whether we 
                                                 
16 Roush argues something like this in her (2010). 
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have moral knowledge? I am not investigating whether we have moral knowledge because 
whether knowledge does anything to improve our chances of goal completion depends on which 
properties compose or are necessary for it. I do not need to weigh in on the disputed question of 
the nature of knowledge in order to show that truth tracking is the property that should concern 
us when we investigate the epistemic status of our moral beliefs. However, if the conditions of 
sensitivity, adherence, or safety are related to knowledge in some way, the pragmatic value 
conferred by these conditions can help explain the pragmatic value of knowledge.17 Knowledge 
may be in some nonpragmatic sense have greater value than truth tracking belief, but even if this 
is true, having knowledge instead of truth tracking belief would not help us accomplish 
obligations, which is my primary focus in this project. 
The criteria for justification, like the criteria for knowledge, are disputed. I am not 
investigating our chances of completing moral goals by looking at whether our moral beliefs are 
justified for the same reasons I am not looking at whether our moral beliefs are known: whether 
justification is pragmatically valuable will depend on what it is, and it seems more efficient to 
discuss the value of such properties directly. If justification is related to sensitivity, adherence, or 
safety, then my discussion on the value of these properties will cast light on the value of 
justification. If justification is conferred by one of the truth-conducive properties discussed 
above, such as being based on good evidence or being the product of a reliable process, then the 
value of justification comes from the fact that it increases the chances that one will match the 
proposition. If justification confers only non-pragmatic value, then like the deontological 
properties, it would not be the appropriate subject for this sort of investigation.  
                                                 
17 Roush, for instance, thinks that the value of truth tracking explains the value of knowledge. 
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The most interesting category of alternative or additional desiderata might be properties 
of systems of beliefs, such as coherence and completeness, and properties of processes for 
acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs, such as speed and efficiency. One might think 
that the value we obtain from such desiderata does not reduce to the value obtained from having 
matching attitudes, or a high probability of matching attitudes, about particular propositions. 
Perhaps our chances of goal completion will be affected independently by the completeness of 
our body of beliefs, for instance, or by the efficiency with which we acquire relevant new true 
beliefs and discard false ones. Efficiency might have independent value if factors other than 
whether we match particular propositions play an important role in determining chances of goal 
completion. For instance, perhaps an agent’s chances of goal completion would be greatly helped 
if she had a matching attitude about p. But to obtain a matching attitude about p, she would need 
to expend a great deal of energy and time, and these expenditures would seriously compromise 
her chances of goal completion. So, before investigating the chances of completing a particular 
goal by assessing the probability that one will match a set of propositions, it might be necessary 
to check whether the value of matching the propositions in that set would be outweighed or 
counteracted by other factors, such as expenditures of time or energy. 
However, the pragmatic value conferred by some of these properties of systems of beliefs 
and processes that produce beliefs can still be reduced to the value of matching a proposition. 
The value of the speed at which we acquire and revise our beliefs seems to be accounted for in 
the probability that we will match p at the relevant times. If one’s belief production process is 
slow, the probability that one will match in a given case is lower. Similarly, the value of 
completeness, in my view, derives from the fact that it is valuable to match some set of 
propositions. It is valuable to have a more complete body of beliefs because (in a simple case) if 
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there are three propositions that it would be valuable to match, it is better to match all three than 
just two. As far as coherence, I think that it is possible to incorporate anything that coherence 
might do to increase one’s chances of goal completion into the assessment of which propositions 
and sets of propositions it would be valuable to match. Before one investigates whether we 
match or are likely to match a proposition or set of propositions, one investigates if it would be 
advantageous to match that proposition or set of propositions, and if it would not be 
advantageous to match a certain incoherent set of beliefs, this should be uncovered at that first 
step.  
2.8 WHAT DETERMINES SENSITIVITY, ADHERENCE, AND THE PROBABILITY 
OF MATCHING? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAUSES AND TRUTH 
TRACKING 
The probability that an agent’s attitude about a proposition will match the truth value of a 
proposition, as I have discussed, is determined by the interdefined terms Pr(p), Pr(Bp), 
Pr(~Bp|~p) (sensitivity), Pr(Bp|p) (adherence), Pr(p|Bp) (safety), and Pr(~p|~Bp) (safety 
counterpart). The causes of our moral attitudes determine Pr(Bp). Relations between these causes 
and the facts—whether it is the case that p—affect the agent’s degree of sensitivity, adherence, 
safety, and safety counterpart. 
As Roush notes, in practice humans only have truth-tracking beliefs because there are 
certain processes that exist between the fact of the matter and a belief about the fact of the 
matter. Roush writes, “it happens to be a contingent fact about human beings that we can’t fulfill 
the tracking conditions without intermediaries: causal processes, one event indicating another, 
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one trait correlated with another, our eyes, our brains, having dispositions to respond 
differentially, testimony of witnesses, and so forth” (Roush 2010, 269). In my view, all the 
intermediaries that Roush mentions, as well as things like inferences and reasoning processes, 
are causal processes linking facts and beliefs. I should note, though, that in addition to direct 
causal connections between fact and belief, causal relations in which one thing causally 
influences both belief and fact of the matter (if there are relations of this sort in the moral 
domain) would affect probability of matching as well. In sum, the probability of matching is 
determined by causal relations in the world. Consequently, investigating the causes of our beliefs 
can potentially help us obtain information about the probability that our moral beliefs match.  
To assess whether an agent has a high degree of adherence with regard to p, we should 
see whether we can obtain evidence about how much her attitude is influenced by factors that are 
not connected in the right way to the fact of the matter—e.g. factors that are morally irrelevant—
or evidence that the causes of our beliefs made us unlikely to obtain the belief we have or likely 
to lose our belief in the future. Much of the literature on the debunking potential of evolution and 
other causes of our moral beliefs has focused on a problem that can be understood in terms of the 
failure of adherence without recognizing that adherence is the property in question. People point 
out that it could have easily been the case that the belief was not held (which is only noteworthy 
if there is no reason to think that the fact of the matter would have changed—people usually do 
not state this accompanying premise explicitly). To assess whether an agent has a high degree of 
sensitivity with regard to p, we will be looking for evidence about how heavily determined the 
belief is by potentially irrelevant influences or how inflexible one’s attitude would be in the face 
of many variations in one’s circumstances. If irrelevant influences seem to determine the belief 
or if the belief is unusually incorrigible, it is likely that the belief would be maintained even if 
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the proposition were false. In the next two chapters, I examine several psychological and 
evolutionary causes of our moral beliefs and I characterize three debunking arguments that can 
employ information about the causes of moral beliefs to produce conclusions about the 
probability that we match moral propositions relevant for achieving moral goals. 
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3.0  THE PRIORITY OF PROXIMAL CAUSES AND THREE PROXIMAL 
DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS 
In this chapter, I will argue that we should start our investigation into what the causes of moral 
beliefs tell us about their epistemic status by looking at proximal rather than distal causes. I will 
begin by providing a general argument for the priority of proximal causes. Then I will turn to the 
three debunking arguments, illustrating each with a particular case. The first argument I discuss 
is what I call the dysfunctional component argument, which I will apply to the case of moral 
beliefs about helping that hinge on the activation of sympathy. The second is the argument from 
incompatible variability, which I illustrate with cases of moral political beliefs, punishment 
judgments subject to influence by emotion, and beliefs influenced by disgust. The third is the 
argument from inappropriately improbable belief, which I also illustrate with the case of beliefs 
influenced by disgust. In each of the cases I discuss in this chapter, we can reach conclusions 
about the epistemic status of moral beliefs influenced by proximal causes without examining the 
distal causes of moral beliefs.  
3.1 PROXIMAL CAUSES AS A SUPERIOR SOURCE OF EVIDENCE ABOUT 
EPISTEMIC STATUS 
I argue that the sort of information we have about distal causes of moral beliefs is 
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relevant for assessing the epistemic status of moral beliefs only if we cannot determine whether 
the proximal process underlying these beliefs is reliable just by looking at the properties of that 
proximal process. The influence of evolution, a source of more distal causes, will be relevant in 
some cases, but my thesis implies that any investigation into the epistemic status of moral beliefs 
given their causes should start with proximal causes. 
The philosophical literature on the causes of moral beliefs can be divided into two broad 
categories: work dealing with more distal causes of human morality, especially evolution 
(whether biological or cultural), and those dealing with more proximal influences on moral 
belief, such as emotions. There has been much discussion recently about what the evolutionary 
origins of the psychological processes underlying moral beliefs imply for the epistemic status of 
moral beliefs, especially in response to Richard Joyce’s (2001, 2006) and Sharon Street’s (2006, 
2008) work (e.g. Machery and Mallon 2010; Copp 2008; Enoch 2010; Schafer 2010; Kahane 
2011; Brosnan 2011; Fraser 2014; Griffiths and Wilkins n.d.). Street has said that evolution does 
not pose a unique threat to moral beliefs, and that the same sort of problem that evolution raises 
could be posed by “any kind of causal influence on the content of our evaluative judgments” 
(Street 2006, 155). Despite this, evolution has attracted disproportionate attention in the 
literature. There has recently been some discussion, though, about what more proximal causes 
(such as emotions) of moral beliefs signify for the epistemic status of moral beliefs (e.g. Singer 
2005; Greene 2008; Sinnott Armstrong 2008; Berker 2009; Joyce 2008, Kahane and Shackel 
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2010; Kelly 2011; Kahane 2012).18 There is also a broader literature into which the topic of the 
causes of moral beliefs falls: literature on how causes affect epistemic status of beliefs generally 
(e.g. Cohen 2000, Sher 2001, Leiter 2004, White 2010, Vavova forthcoming, Joyce 2013, 
forthcoming, Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, Shafer-Landau 2012, Bedke 2009, ms, Setiya 2013). 
There are parallel discussions about the evolutionary or other distal origins of other types of 
beliefs, such as mathematical and logical beliefs (Schechter 2013, Clark-Doane 2012). 
3.2 THE PRIORITY OF PROXIMAL CAUSES 
My thesis says that we should give priority to proximal causes in our investigation of the 
epistemic status of moral beliefs. In this section I present a general argument for this thesis. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, the sort of epistemic status that should concern us is the 
probability that our epistemic attitudes about moral propositions match the truth value of those 
propositions. Beliefs are the product of many sorts of causes. Most directly, beliefs are the 
product of psychological processes. These psychological processes are produced by 
developmental processes. Developmental processes are themselves the product of evolutionary 
processes. Thus, beliefs are the product of a proximal psychological process, which is produced 
by (or is part of) a developmental process, which is itself the product of (or is part of) the more 
                                                 
18 Andreas L. Mogenson also has a recent paper, “Evolutionary debunking arguments and the 
proximate/ultimate distinction,” on the relevance of proximate and ultimate causes for 
debunking, but it addresses a question orthogonal to my topic here. 
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distal evolutionary processes.19 By a distal cause of a belief, then, I refer here specifically to a 
higher-order process that produces the proximal process that produces the belief. Evolution is a 
distal cause of our beliefs in this sense because it produces the psychological processes within 
individuals that produce beliefs. The available information about the evolutionary process 
leading to our moral psychology that could shed light on the epistemic status of moral beliefs is 
either information about the probability that we would obtain the moral faculties that we have or 
ones that are similar, or information about the probability that evolution would produce reliable 
moral faculties.20  
By contrast, examining properties of the moral beliefs themselves and of the proximal 
processes that produce them can provide excellent evidence about whether the moral beliefs and 
causal processes that we actually have possess the features that they would need to have if they 
were, respectively, true and truth tracking.  
If we can ascertain whether the proximal process tracks the truth on the basis of features 
of that process, looking at the distal process that produced that proximal process provides us with 
no additional information about the epistemic status of our beliefs. By contrast, if we ascertain 
the probability that the distal process would produce a truth tracking proximal process, we can 
still gain additional information about the epistemic status of our beliefs by looking at the 
features of the actual proximal process that the distal process ended up producing. For instance, 
even if we determine that the distal process has a low probability of producing truth tracking 
                                                 
19 This way of thinking of about the relationship between causal processes comes from C. H. 
Waddington (e.g. 1959). 
20 I return to the difference between these two kinds of information later in the chapter. 
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proximal processes, our proximal process may nonetheless, against the odds, be one that tracks 
the truth. In such a case, we can potentially gain additional information by investigating the 
proximal process directly. The only sort of situation in which information about the distal 
process alone could be sufficient to permit conclusions about the epistemic status of moral 
beliefs would be one where the distal process had a probability of 1 or 0 of producing proximal 
processes of a given degree of reliability. The evolutionary origins of the faculties that produce 
moral beliefs can provide us with some information about whether our moral beliefs track the 
truth, but there is an asymmetry in how much they can tell us compared with how much proximal 
processes can tell us. I propose that in principle information about proximal causes is sufficient 
for ascertaining whether our moral beliefs track the truth, but that information about distal causes 
is not sufficient for the same purpose.  
If we could determine just by looking at features of our moral psychological processes 
that we track moral facts, we would not need to investigate how probable it was that evolution 
would produce truth tracking moral psychological processes. A parallel point holds if we can 
determine on the basis of features of our moral psychological process that we do not track the 
truth of moral facts. In such a case, we need not investigate the probability that a truth tracking 
psychological process would evolve. I am skeptical that we can ever conclude with confidence 
on the basis of information about the features of moral psychological processes that we track the 
truth of moral facts, but, as I show with the cases of disgust and sympathy, it is sometimes 
possible to conclude with confidence that we do not track the truth of moral facts without 
looking at distal processes.  
In cases where we cannot conclusively determine the reliability or unreliability of our 
proximal processes on the basis of information about their features alone, we can use information 
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about the evolutionary origins of these processes to inform our assessment of the epistemic status 
of moral beliefs. For instance, if we cannot gather enough information about whether our current 
proximal process tracks the truth because there is conflicting evidence or we have an inadequate 
understanding of the proximal process, the probability that evolution would have produced a 
process that tracked the facts in question can provide additional information. Alternately, if we 
were interested in the epistemic status of moral beliefs across multiple generations, and the 
relevant psychological processes would be subject to continued influence from evolution, 
information about evolution could improve our estimation of whether those psychological 
processes will track the truth in future generations. These are the situations to which the 
evolutionary debunking arguments advanced by Street, Joyce, and others are useful—situations 
where we cannot already be confident about whether proximal processes track truth just by 
looking at the features of those processes. But if we can determine with confidence the reliability 
of proximal processes on the basis of the features of those processes, we need not look at distal 
causes in order to draw conclusions about truth tracking. Thus, when we set out to ascertain 
whether our moral beliefs track the truth, our first stop should be the empirical work on proximal 
psychological processes rather than work on the evolution of those proximal processes.  
This point generalizes to beliefs outside morality. That is, information about proximal 
processes is more valuable than information about distal processes even when we are assessing 
the epistemic status of non-moral beliefs. As illustration of the generality of the priority of 
proximal causes, consider a case from outside the domain of morality of beliefs produced by 
proximal processes that are themselves produced by distal processes of varying degrees of 
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reliability.21 Suppose there are two people, Juana and Marta, and we want to evaluate the 
epistemic status of their beliefs about certain mathematical propositions. Suppose we are 
confident that each acquired reliable mathematical reasoning processes early in life that regularly 
produce true beliefs about some set of mathematical propositions. We are confident that each 
will continue to hold these mathematical reasoning processes for the rest of her life. If we were 
only interested in these two people and their beliefs about the relevant set of mathematical 
propositions, and we could be confident that their mathematical reasoning processes were 
reliable, then we could be confident that each is tracking the truth of these mathematical 
propositions, regardless of where their reasoning processes came from. 
However, if we were unsure about whether each person possessed a reliable 
mathematical reasoning process, we could obtain some information about whether they track the 
truth by looking at the distal process by which they obtained their mathematical reasoning 
processes. Suppose the distal process by which Juana obtained her mathematical reasoning 
process was reading a reputable mathematics textbook, and the process by which Marta obtained 
her mathematical reasoning process was listening to a local mystic who usually disseminates 
mathematical falsehoods and ineffective tricks. Looking at those distal processes provides us 
with information about the probability that each woman acquired a reliable mathematical 
reasoning process—high in Juana’s case, low in Marta’s case, Of course, the information we 
obtain by this route misleads us here, since in fact Marta against the odds acquired a reliable 
proximal process and does track the truth of the relevant propositions. We would be better off 
with good information about the proximal reasoning processes that Juana and Marta actually 
                                                 
21 This case is a modification of Goldman’s Humperdink case (1986, 51-52). 
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possess.   
However, suppose we also have an interest in the epistemic status of the mathematical 
beliefs of others in the same society, in particular, in the beliefs of the young daughters of Juana 
and Martina, who have not yet acquired their mathematical reasoning processes. Even if we 
know that Juana and Marta have reliable mathematical reasoning processes, it would be helpful 
for the purpose of gauging the epistemic status of the beliefs of others to know that Juana 
obtained her mathematical reasoning processes by textbook and Marta by mystic. If the next 
generation obtains its mathematical reasoning abilities from the same sources, it is very likely 
that some of them will end up with unreliable mathematical reasoning processes and will 
consequently be likely to believe mathematical falsehoods and lack beliefs in mathematical 
truths. Thus, distal processes can add information for our assessment of the status of beliefs in 
cases where we cannot assess the reliability of proximal processes of interest, whether due to 
limited information about the proximal process or because the distal process continues to exert 
influence on the proximal processes that will produce the beliefs of interest.  
Thus, distal processes can supply useful information for our assessment of the status of 
beliefs in cases where we are unsure about the reliability of proximal processes. In other cases, 
distal processes do not provide information for assessing epistemic status beyond what can be 
gained from information about proximal processes.  
I have argued that any investigation into the epistemic status of moral beliefs given their 
causes should start with proximal causes. In cases where we are confident in our estimation of 
the degree to which a proximal process tracks the truth, we need not look at the distal origins of 
those proximal causes in order to draw conclusions about the epistemic status of the moral 
beliefs that they influence. 
 52 
3.3 THREE DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS 
In this second part of the chapter I introduce three debunking arguments that can be constructed 
using information about the causes of moral beliefs and that minimize normative assumptions. 
Each argument is of potentially narrow scope, applying to just a subset of moral beliefs. I apply 
each argument to one or two cases of types of moral beliefs. Each of these arguments also 
employs etiological information only about proximal rather than distal causes, serving as 
examples to demonstrate that information about properties of a proximal cause can be sufficient 
to conclude that moral beliefs influenced by that cause have a poor epistemic status. The 
arguments I introduce are the following: (1) the malfunctioning component argument, which I 
apply to the case of moral beliefs that hinge on sympathy, (2) the inconsistent variability 
argument, which comes in two forms (a) attitude hypervariability, which I apply to the case of (i) 
punishment judgments subject to variation due to the influence of emotions, and the case of (ii) 
political beliefs that change due to factors that vary with age, and (b) attitude hypovariability, 
which I apply to the case of moral judgments that have been influenced by disgust 
(incorrigibility), and lastly (3) the Inappropriately Improbable Belief Argument, which should 
lead one to distrust judgments influenced by disgust as a result of disgustingness’s property of 
transmissibility.  
3.3.1 The Malfunctioning Component Argument: Sympathy 
The first argument I propose identifies a component in the moral belief production process for 
which we have independent methods for assessing reliability, and shows that the component is 
malfunctioning. I am not claiming that this is any sort of evolved or designed function, nor that 
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the function is ever successfully performed; I am claiming that we can sometimes identify the 
function that the component would need to perform if it were to contribute to the process 
tracking the truth. The idea is that we can sometimes infer that moral judgments are not truth 
tracking because the moral judgment hinges on a non-normative judgment that we know does not 
track whatever it would need to be tracking for the moral judgment to track the truth.  
In the case of moral beliefs that rely on sympathy, the targeted component is 
malfunctioning sympathy activation. If sympathy were to contribute to truth tracking moral 
beliefs, I take it that it would do so by picking out entities that are suffering. I show that at this 
task sympathy produces both false positives and false negatives at a significant rate, and 
conclude that moral beliefs that hinge on the reliable activation of sympathy are neither sensitive 
nor adherent and we should reduce our confidence in such beliefs.  
This argument might appear to bear a resemblance to what Nichols (2014) calls a 
“process debunking argument.” Nichols (2014) characterizes the process debunking argument as 
an argument in which one concludes that a belief is unjustified by showing that a belief is the 
product of a process that is known to be epistemically defective (e.g., distorting or unreliable), 
such as dreaming or wishful thinking (2). However, the malfunctioning component argument is a 
specific method for showing that the process leading to moral beliefs is epistemically defective 
(e.g. that it is unreliable or that it does not reliably produce matching beliefs about a set of 
propositions); the method is to show that a component of the process is performing whatever 
function it would need to perform for the process as a whole to be reliable.   
The psychological cause I will use to illustrate this argument is the emotional process of 
feeling bad for someone else, or what Maibom calls “affectively infused concern for the other's 
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welfare” (2012, 62).22 I use the term “sympathy” to refer to this process, but much research on 
“compassion” appears to be concerned with the same phenomenon (for a review of the 
compassion literature, see Goetz 2010).23 Frequently when we judge that we or someone else 
should aid a person or other entity, we are led to do this by the process involving sympathy. 
Certainly there are also cases where we judge that a person should be given help without 
experiencing sympathy—for instance, policymakers may decide they should allocate resources 
to a group they know to be needy without feeling sympathy for the members of the group. The 
moral judgments that I claim are not truth tracking are those that are the product of a process in 
which sympathy activation plays a substantial role: situations where if one feels sympathy, one is 
much more likely to judge that an entity should be helped, and if one does not feel sympathy, one 
is much less likely to make the judgment that the entity should be helped. 
I take it that if sympathy activation were ever to help us make matching moral judgments 
about propositions related to whether someone ought to help another entity, it would do so by 
accurately picking out entities that are suffering or that are otherwise are in a situation that could 
conceivably be improved. Consequently, we should be concerned about how reliably sympathy 
picks out those entities that are in fact in pain. There is reason for concern in two directions: 
                                                 
22 Similarly, Pfattheicher et al. characterize sympathy as “concern for suffering others” (3). This 
has also been called “empathic concern,” Batson studied something like this under the name of 
empathy, and it may the same thing that Prinz calls “concern.” 
23 I focus on sympathy/compassion rather than on related processes like empathy or emotional 
contagion or distress, because I take it that these latter psychological processes have less a 
connection to the judgment that an entity should be helped. 
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reliance on sympathy produces both false positives and false negatives. It sometimes leads us to 
classify entities as in pain when we have independent reason to believe that they are not in pain, 
and it sometimes leads us to classify entities as not in pain when we have independent reasons to 
believe that they are in fact in pain.  
On the false negatives side this mechanism of pain attribution appears less likely to 
engage when it comes to outgroup members. People often empathize less with outgroup 
members experiencing pain than ingroup members. For instance, Trawalter and colleagues 
(2012) show that white subjects tend to attribute lower levels of pain to black people (see also 
Cikara and Fiske 2011).  
Another case of false negatives comes from the well-known human disposition to feel 
sympathy for non-human animals with certain features and not for non-human animals that lack 
those features but that we have equally good reason to think experience comparable levels pain.  
On the false positives side, consider recent work on robots. Rosenthal-von der Putten and 
colleagues (2012) found that subjects who watched videos of robots being treated violently 
exhibited higher physiological arousal, expressed empathy for the robot, and reported more 
negative emotional reactions than subjects who watched videos of robots being treated in a 
friendly way. Rosenthal-von der Putten and colleagues also found similar patterns of brain 
activation when subjects watched videos of humans and robots being treated affectionately 
(though admittedly somewhat higher brain activation when subjects viewed humans being 
treated violently than when they viewed robots being treated violently). Anecdotal evidence 
about the use of companion robots like “Paro,” a seal-like robot, and “Keepo,” a robot that looks 
like an Easter peep, also suggests a tendency to respond to entities that exhibit certain features, 
such as cuteness and responsiveness, as if these were entities capable of suffering. Anecdotal 
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reports indicate that soldiers frequently become “fond of” the robots they use in battle and that 
some soldiers have actually risked their own lives to rescue robots—presumably not just because 
the robot was a valuable piece of machinery (Singer 2009). Also, work by Bartneck and Hu 
(2008) found that, although when instructed to do so, subjects destroyed robots with which they 
had interacted, the subjects expressed hesitance and regret, saying things like “I didn’t like to kill 
the poor boy,” “The robot is innocent,” and “This is inhumane!” (426).24 (For further discussion 
of this case and the features that lead subjects to attribute pain to robots, see Fiala, Arico, and 
Nichols 2014.) 
If it is a sympathy-dependent process that leads us to think we should, for instance, avoid 
stepping on insects, prohibit abortion, or keep patients in a persistent vegetative state alive, the 
fact that this emotional pain-detection process so easily produces false positives may be reason to 
reduce confidence in our beliefs and to make our judgments about whether the entities in 
question experience pain using a method that does not hinge on sympathy. Likewise, if our 
judgments as policy makers or individuals about how to distribute resources or whom to assist 
are heavily dependent on the activation of sympathy as we consider each case, then in contexts 
where we are not feeling sympathetic we should decrease confidence in the conclusion that we 
need not aid the entity under consideration.   
This is not to say that it would be better to ignore sympathy completely when detecting 
entities in pain in the world—it may yet serve as a heuristic in contexts where we lack alternative 
                                                 
24 Of course, it is not inconceivable that a sufficiently complex robot could experience pain, and 
in particular pain in whatever sense is morally relevant. However, in the case of these simple 
robots, I think we have no reason to think that they experience pain. 
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methods for ascertaining whether an entity is suffering. Rather, the suggestion is that we should 
reduce confidence in beliefs involving pain attributions that are substantially determined by 
whether we experience sympathy, at least until we have identified the features that characterize 
the contexts where our sympathy-dependent pain attribution judgments go astray. In addition, it 
may be possible to refine or improve our sympathy response somehow in the future.  
Bloom (2013) and Prinz (2011) have also recently argued against the reliability of 
empathy in moral contexts; some of their arguments seem to apply just as well to what I am 
calling to sympathy.25 However, their arguments are different from mine in ways worth 
distinguishing.  
Bloom offers several reasons to think that empathy is unreliable. Several of these reasons 
stem from the idea that “The power of this faculty [empathy] has something to do with its ability 
to bring our moral concern into a laser pointer of focused attention” (2013, n.p.). He highlights 
the Baby Jessica case and similar cases where public attention focuses on one person who is 
suffering and little attention is paid to many others suffering as much or more. Research suggests 
a number of reasons this happens, such as the identifiable victim effect. I interpret this problem 
for the status of our moral judgments in the following way: if there are a number of people 
experiencing an equal level of suffering, and our judgments about who we or others should help 
                                                 
25 Sam Harris (2014) also has a related argument, against moral decisions guided solely by 
empathy. He says, “To be moved to action merely by empathy is to lurch blindly toward who 
knows what.” His argument seems to be that judging that some act is wrong solely because of the 
activation of empathy is problematic because one fails to weigh the badness of the act against 
other considerations. 
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are substantially determined by empathy, we cannot be tracking the truth of whether any 
particular person ought to be helped, or perhaps how much each should be helped, because our 
judgments about these questions depend on our level of empathy for that person, which depends 
on whether that person happens to be an identifiable victim or has attracted the attention of the 
public. Bloom’s argument is slightly more complicated than the one I introduce above, where I 
argued that sympathy is not dependable for identifying presence of suffering, which is a 
requirement for making matching judgments about whether another person ought to be helped. 
Bloom’s argument has to do with how assistance should be allocated when there are multiple 
entities that are suffering. Our judgments on this question are affected by identifiability of the 
victim and the level of attention they attract, and these factors do not track levels of suffering; in 
addition, Bloom’s argument needs to assume that identifiability of the victim and the level of 
attention they attract do not themselves make a difference to whether one ought to help the 
victim and do not track something about the victim that affects whether one ought to help him or 
her. Presumably many people will be willing to accept those assumptions, but they are worth 
noting.  
Bloom also argues that if we feel worse about 20,000 people dying than 2000, it is due 
our rational capacity to compare the numbers, not empathy. Empathy does not respond 
differentially to these scenarios in a way that reflects the numbers if each life were worth the 
same. I interpret the problem this argument poses in the following way: we must not be tracking 
how much assistance should be given to a suffering group of 20,000 because an empathy-driven 
process would involve as much empathy in response to that group as to a group of 2,000, and if 
this process determines our judgment about how much help each group should receive, we will 
treat them as equivalent. Yet, we can assume that a larger group of suffering entities warrants 
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more assistance than a smaller group, all other things being equal, and so our process fails to 
detect a morally relevant difference in these two cases. Again the normative assumption that has 
to be made here is one that many will be willing to accept, but it is worth noting. Prinz makes a 
similar argument.  
Bloom also sketches a number of other problems with empathy that I think require more 
substantial normative assumptions to flesh out. He observes that empathy may make us more 
likely to focus on immediate problems than more important but less salient problems—this is a 
suggestion that requires a standard for assessing the moral saliency of problems. Feeling 
empathy for victims, he says, may also motivate subjects to punish perpetrators even if the long-
term consequences will be worse if the perpetrators are punished. For this argument, we need a 
standard for assessing the badness of consequences, which is a much more substantial demand 
than the assumption that more suffering people should be given more aid than fewer suffering 
people (or even more minimally that the number of suffering entities affects how much aid 
should be provided), that the identifiability of a suffering entity and whether he or she has 
attracted public attention do not track differences in how much help that entity should receive, 
or, as I assumed, that if sympathy were to contribute to truth tracking moral processes it would 
do so by reliably picking out entities that are suffering. 
Prinz also identifies several problems with empathy: it is not substantially involved in 
“thinking about inequality, the environment, or cases where large groups of people are 
threatened,” yet these are “core aspects of moral reasoning”; “empathy is easily manipulated, 
leading us to give preferential treatment to those who don’t deserve it”; and “empathy is biased: 
it increases when those in need are salient, similar to ourselves, and close by.” This first 
argument involves the idea that there are moral considerations related to inequality and the 
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environment that are worth attending to (something I take to be a substantive normative 
assumption) but that empathy is not good at tracking; the second requires a normative account of 
desert, and the third requires plausibly disputable assumptions about the moral irrelevance of 
saliency, similarity to oneself, and physical distance.  
The argument that I have presented says that sympathy, on which some moral judgments 
depends, is unreliable at picking out what it would need to pick out if it were to help such moral 
beliefs track the truth. Consequently, we should decrease confidence in moral beliefs that are the 
product of a process substantially relying on sympathy activation. The malfunctioning 
component argument can be applied to a number of other contributors to moral beliefs, such as 
judgments about actors’ intentions, the causal structure of a series of events, and judgments 
about expected consequences of a given action. The accuracy of judgments about intentions, the 
causal structure of the world, and expected consequences of actions can be investigated 
independently of normative questions. If we can show that important contributors to moral 
beliefs are unreliable or subject to errors that we can identify independently, we can conclude 
that the moral beliefs themselves are not tracking the truth.  
3.3.2 The Argument from Inconsistent Variability 
The second debunking argument I propose operates by establishing that a cause of one’s attitudes 
confers on them properties that are inconsistent with plausible general features of moral 
propositions. In particular, the general feature of moral propositions that the argument from 
inconsistent variability appeals to is that the truth value of the moral proposition varies in some 
particular way over a time period of interest.  
This debunking argument emerges from a strategy for assessing one’s epistemic position 
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with respect to a proposition under a condition of limited information, in which one has little 
good first order evidence for or against the proposition. The attraction of this type of debunking 
argument is that one is able to construct it without knowing the truth value of the proposition of 
interest at any point.  
The strategy consists of comparing the level of variability in the truth value of a 
proposition of interest with the level of variability in one’s attitudes about that proposition, over 
some time period of interest.26 If the level of variability of the truth value of a proposition is 
dissimilar to the level of variability in a person’s attitudes about that proposition, then some 
proportion of the person’s attitudes about the proposition over time are in error. Evidence of 
inconsistent levels of variability is evidence that one does not track the truth of the proposition. 
In the moral domain there are situations where we know that the truth value of the proposition in 
question does not vary across the times during which we consider it, even though we may not 
know whether the proposition is true or false at any of those times, so this debunking argument 
has particular value in the moral domain.  
I will begin my introduction of this argument by demonstrating the epistemic significance 
of inconsistent levels of variability and discussing how we can identify inconsistent levels of 
variability in moral attitudes and the truth value of propositions. Then I will apply these general 
                                                 
26 I will assume that the truth value of propositions can change over time. For those who take the 
position that the truth value of propositions does not change over time, my argument may be 
translated into different terms: the comparison will be between the diversity in the timeless truth 
value of the propositions expressed by uses of a given sentence over the time period of interest 
and the variability in one’s attitudes about the propositions expressed by uses of the sentence. 
 62 
points to moral beliefs, discussing two illustrations of attitude hypervariability, one form of the 
inconsistent variability argument, and then one illustration of attitude hypovariability, the second 
form of the inconsistent variability argument. The cases that illustrate attitude hypervariability 
are: (i) moral political beliefs that vary with age and (ii) judgments about punishment, which are 
vulnerable to influence by extraneous emotions. The case that illustrates attitude hypovariability 
is the case of moral beliefs that are the product of a process that includes the influence of disgust. 
I conclude that none of these classes of belief are truth tracking and that we should substantially 
reduce our confidence in these types of beliefs.  
3.3.3 The Epistemic Significance of an Inconsistency in Levels of Variability 
 
An argument from inconsistent variability draws epistemic conclusions from an inconsistency in 
the level of variability of the truth value of a proposition and the level of variability in whether a 
subject has or lacks a belief in the proposition. S’s attitudes about p exhibit a high level of 
variability if S’s attitude about p frequently changes—e.g. from belief that p to belief that ~p, or 
from no belief about p to belief that p—over some duration of interest. The truth value of p 
exhibits high variability if the truth value of p frequently changes over the duration of interest. 
An inconsistency in levels of variability could happen in two ways: 
Attitude hypervariability: S’s attitudes are more variable than the truth value of p. 
Attitude hypovariability: S’s attitudes are less variable than the truth value of p. 
When we investigate the levels of variability in attitudes and the truth value of p, there 
are three possible outcomes: attitude hypervariability, attitude hypovariability, or levels of 
variability that are consistent with S routinely matching p. If S’s attitudes about p are to match 
 63 
the truth value of p most of the time, or, in other words, for S to tend to believe p when p is true 
and lack belief in p when p is false, it must be the case that S’s attitudes vary at approximately 
the rate at which the truth value of the proposition varies over the duration of interest. This is a 
necessary condition for S’s matching p most of the time. It is not sufficient, though: attitudes 
could change at the same rate as the rate at which the truth value of the proposition changes but 
nonetheless fail to match (e.g. if S always lacked belief in p when p and believed p when not 
p).27 So, if we find that S’s attitudes change about as much as we think the truth value of p 
changes, this is consistent with S’s attitudes tending to match the truth value of p over the 
duration of interest, but we cannot conclude much more. 
Discovery of an inconsistency in levels of variability, by contrast, can support more 
significant epistemic conclusions. Each of the two types of inconsistency supports different 
conclusions. In an extreme version of attitude hypervariability, the truth value of p is mostly 
static; in such a case, p will be either usually true or usually false. Now, if over the time period of 
interest p is mostly true, and S’s attitudes about p vary substantially, S is frequently failing to 
believe p when p is the case: there is a failure of positive matching. If this sort of pattern is 
probable, it cannot be that S is likely to believe p given p, so S does not have a high degree of 
adherence with regard to p. If over the time period of interest p is mostly false, and S’s attitude 
                                                 
27 It could also be that over the time period we compare variability levels, there is the same 
overall level of variability, but there is variation in variability levels over that time period. In this 
case, overall levels of variability are consistent with matching but there could nonetheless be 
little matching. So, similar overall levels of variability do not provide great evidence for 
matching. 
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about p changes a great deal, S will frequently believe p in cases where p is false—there is a 
failure of negative matching. If this sort of pattern is probable, it cannot be the case that S is 
likely to not believe p when p is not the case, and so S does not have a high degree of sensitivity 
with regard to p. In short, attitude hypervariability implies that S is insensitive or nonadherent 
with regard to p. To reach a specific conclusion about sensitivity or adherence—either the 
conclusion that S is not sensitive or the conclusion that S is not adherent—requires a premise 
about whether p tends to be true or whether it tends to be false. Without that premise, in a 
situation of limited information, we can only conclude that either p is usually false and S is not 
sensitive, or p is usually true and S is not adherent.28 Regardless, from evidence of a significant 
difference in levels of variability we can infer that S’s epistemic situation is poor.  
For instance, suppose S wants to know whether the temperature outside is between 50-60 
degrees, and S forms beliefs on this question solely via a thermometer outside. S could go 
outside and check what the thermometer says, but from inside S cannot see what the 
thermometer reads. What S can see from inside, though, is that the mercury in the thermometer is 
all over the place—it varies wildly over the course of, say, ten minutes. Even though S does not 
have any sense of the temperature outside or of what the thermometer reads at any particular 
time, if her background knowledge of how the weather operates in the area indicates that the 
temperature outside always varies very little over the course of ten minutes, she can conclude 
that her process of determining the temperature produces attitude hypervariability. Consequently, 
                                                 
28 Given that the variation in S’s attitudes is substantial, a reliabilist could also infer that the 
process leading to S’s attitudes about this proposition is not reliable, in the sense that true beliefs 
are not a sufficiently high percentage of the attitudes it produces. 
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S can conclude that she is in a poor epistemic position with regard to the proposition that it is 50-
60 degrees outside: she is insensitive or nonadherent with regard to that proposition. Either it is 
false that she is likely to not believe p given that p is false; or it is false that she is likely to 
believe p given that p is true. 
The second type of inconsistency between levels of variability, attitude hypovariability, 
occurs when S’s attitude changes less frequently than the truth value of p. At the extremes, S 
either tends to believe p or S tends to not believe p. If over the time period of interest, S tends to 
believe p, S will frequently believe p in those cases where p is false (failure of negative 
matching). Consequently, supposing this pattern of attitudes is probable, S must not have a high 
degree of sensitivity. On the other hand, if over the time period of interest, S tends to not believe 
p, S will frequently be failing to believe p in those cases where p is true (failure of positive 
matching). Consequently, S must not have a high degree of adherence. Thus, if S could establish 
that the truth value of p changes a great deal but that she tends to stubbornly hold a belief in p or 
stubbornly lack a belief in p, she could draw a conclusion about sensitivity in the first case or 
adherence in the second case.29  
Thus, as in the case of attitude hypervariability, discovery of a difference in levels of 
variability implies that S’s epistemic situation is poor. For instance, suppose that S looks at an 
                                                 
29 Furthermore, from attitude hypovariability, S can also infer that her process for forming beliefs 
about p is unreliable in the following sense: whether she tends to believe p or not to believe p, if 
the truth value of p varies a great deal, S’s process will not produce a sufficiently high proportion 
of true beliefs out of the set of attitudes her process produces on the subject matter. 
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ordinary clock that reads “1:00.”30 The proposition in question is that it is 1:00. S is interested in 
the truth value of this proposition at the moment she looks at the clock. S knows that the truth 
value of p changes over the course of the day, even if S does not know the truth value of p at any 
given moment. If S discovers that this clock shows no sign of changing the time it reads over 
some long duration, such as an hour, and if she bases her beliefs about the time on a reading of 
the clock, she may conclude that there is an inconsistency between her beliefs and the truth value 
of the proposition, in the form of attitude hypovariability. S’s belief does not change frequently 
enough to be matching the fact of the matter. On the basis of this inconsistency, S can infer that 
she is in a poor epistemic situation with regard to the proposition. She is insensitive with regard 
to the proposition that the time is 1:00, because when it is false that the time is 1:00, she is 
nonetheless highly likely to believe that it is 1:00.31  
Discovery of attitude hypervariability or attitude hypovariability indicates that we are 
erring—failing to match—in some proportion of the situations that concern us. But such a 
discovery has the potential to show not just that errors are being committed, which we accept as 
inevitable in most of our belief-forming processes, but also in some cases that errors are 
occurring at a significant enough rate to mean that we are in a poor epistemic position, failing to 
track the truth of the propositions that interest us. In an argument from inconsistent variability as 
                                                 
30 Suppose the clock, when operating properly, adjusts its hands with discrete movements once 
per minute. 
31 Furthermore, S’s process for forming attitudes on the matter of whether it is 1:00, or, even 
more broadly, on the matter of what time it is, is unreliable (regularly producing the false belief 
that it is 1:00). 
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I formulated it above, evidence of a significant inconsistency in variability between beliefs about 
p and the truth value of p can lead to conclusions about our epistemic status with regard to that 
proposition in terms of sensitivity and adherence.  
3.3.4 How We Can Identify Inconsistent Levels of Variability   
To construct an argument from inconsistent variability we need to identify the levels of 
variability in our attitudes toward p and in the truth value of p. We can often investigate 
empirically the variability of a person’s attitudes about particular propositions or sets of 
propositions, including moral propositions. For example, we can assess the level of variability of 
a person’s attitudes about p from observed variation in the possession of attitudes about p over 
some duration. We can use this information to estimate the level of variability that the person’s 
attitudes will exhibit in other contexts or in the future. But we can also investigate the causal 
processes that produce the person’s attitudes about p to discover how likely she is to believe p in 
various conditions she is likely to encounter. I give examples of each of these methods for 
assessing variability in a later section: in one case I argue that political attitudes are likely to vary 
over one’s lifetime by using evidence about how people’s attitudes have tended to vary in the 
past; in a second case, I show that individuals’ attitudes about punishment are likely to vary by 
using information about the causes of these attitudes. 
We can identify the level of variability in the truth value of a proposition in several ways. 
A direct way is to infer the variability in the truth value of a proposition over some time period 
from information about the truth value of the proposition at various times or factors that vary in 
accordance with the truth value of the proposition. With this sort of information we can gauge 
the proposition’s level of variability, but if we have such information my proposed strategy of 
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assessing variability levels is unnecessary for evaluating the epistemic status of our beliefs—
such information will permit conclusions directly about reliability and truth tracking. But this 
direct approach has limited utility in the moral domain, because part of the problem with 
assessing the epistemic status of moral beliefs is that there is substantial dispute over the truth 
value of moral propositions, as well as dispute over which causes or features of a situation are 
morally relevant and which belief-forming processes are reliable. For instance, if one were 
confident that it is wrong to push a large man off a bridge to stop a trolley, one could criticize a 
process that tends to lead us to the belief that pushing the man is right, and one could claim that 
people who believe this are failing to track the truth. However, there is significant dispute over 
whether pushing the man is right. Similarly, if one were confident that disgust is a distorting 
influence on moral judgments, one could conclude that moral beliefs heavily determined by 
disgust reactions are not the product of a reliable process. However, there is dispute about 
whether disgust is a good or bad guide to the immorality of actions (see, e.g., Kelly 2011, Kass 
1997). It would be better if we could avoid these assumptions. 
Where this direct approach is not feasible there are several ways in which the level of 
variability of a proposition can be assessed. For instance, one might have background knowledge 
that informs one’s estimation of the variability of the truth value of the proposition, as in the 
examples discussed above, where we have background knowledge about the weather or about 
time. Or one may have reasons to think that the proposition has a certain level of variability in 
virtue of the domain to which it belongs. For instance, one may be confident that a logical or 
mathematical proposition is a matter of necessity so that its truth value does not vary over the 
period of interest even though one may not yet know its value or may lack a method for 
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ascertaining it. Lastly, one may know that the truth value of the proposition of interest is heavily 
influenced by some causal factor, and one knows how much that causal factor varies.  
In the moral domain, I suggest that metaethical premises can supply the background 
assumptions that enable one to draw conclusions about the stability of the truth value of certain 
types of moral propositions over various time periods without making normative assumptions. 
Some have argued that certain types of propositions in the moral domain are a matter of 
conceptual or metaphysical necessity (e.g. Swinburne 2004). If one thinks this, one may be 
confident that the truth value of those types of propositions will not vary over whatever period is 
of interest. Alternately, one might think that the truth value of moral propositions is or is not 
affected by some factor, such as social agreement or human nature, and one has a sense of how 
much that factor varies in the time period of interest. For instance, as long as one knows that the 
relevant society has some view on the proposition in question, a contractarian need not know 
whether the society considers the proposition true or false to infer that the truth value of the 
proposition will not change over very short time periods. Of course, any claim about what 
determines the truth value of moral propositions is a significant claim to make. However, the key 
for my argument is that different views about the relevance of various factors overlap 
substantially in the level of stability in the truth value of moral propositions that they imply.32 
The realist might think that it is a mind-independent fact that one should not cause harm on a 
whim; the constructivist might think that it is true that one should not cause harm on a whim 
because our society agrees upon this; an egoist might think that one’s long term self interest 
makes it false that one should not cause harm on a whim. None will think that the truth value of 
                                                 
32 Some (though not all) subjectivist accounts constitute an exception. 
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this proposition will vary over the course of a day or a week. If a person alternates day to day 
between thinking that she should never cause harm on a whim and thinking that she may 
sometimes cause harm on a whim, proponents of each of these metaethical views should be able 
to agree that there is a mismatch between her attitudes and the truth value of the proposition, 
regardless of what that truth value is. 
 
3.3.5 The Inconsistent Levels of Variability Argument Applied in the Moral Domain 
3.3.5.1 Overview 
 
Here I will first show that in the moral domain an argument from attitude hypervariability can 
demonstrate that many people are in a poor epistemic situation with regard to certain types of 
moral propositions. This is because many people’s attitudes about moral propositions of those 
types are likely to vary even though the truth value of the relevant propositions does not vary. In 
other words, in these cases people are likely to believe a moral proposition p at some times and 
to not believe p at other times, when the truth value of p has not changed. I will develop an 
argument from attitude hypervariability for the following two types of moral beliefs: (a) moral 
beliefs in the political domain, which are too likely to vary as one ages, and (b) moral judgments 
about punishment, which are too likely to vary depending on one’s emotional state. In each case, 
the presence of attitude hypervariability should lead us to substantially decrease our confidence 
in certain moral beliefs in the political domain and beliefs about punishment. Then I will show 
that we can also develop an argument from hypovariability in the moral domain, using the case 
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of moral beliefs influenced by disgust, which exhibit a high degree of incorrigibility that makes 
them too invariant to be tracking the truth.  
 
3.3.5.2 Attitude Hypervariability: Case 1: Variability in attitudes on moral questions in 
politics over a lifetime 
 
Here I will discuss variability in moral attitudes related to politics over a lifetime.33 There is 
evidence that as people age they tend to become more conservative on a variety of political 
questions such as those related to harsh treatment of criminals, censorship, and pacifism (Hewitt 
et al. 1977; Truett 1993; Cornelis et al. 2013).34 Ray (1985) found that older people scored 
higher on a scale for general conservatism that included such claims as “Patriotism and loyalty to 
one’s country are more important than one’s intellectual convictions and should have precedence 
over them,” “Treason and murder should be punishable by death,” and “We should have 
                                                 
33 The question of the epistemic significance of variation in belief with age also arises in Colaço 
et al. (2014) in the context of intuitions about knowledge. 
34 See also Ojha and Sah (1990); Lupfer and Rosenberg (1983) conclude that an increase in 
conservatism with age is mediated by life events. There is also evidence that one’s 
socioeconomic class may affect moral judgments (Côté et al. 2013), as may the subject’s level of 
social dominance (Armstrong 2013), each of which are factors that are reasonably likely to 
change over a lifetime. There are other topics on which people’s attitudes are unlikely to vary 
with age, and some topics on which people’s attitudes are likely to change in accordance with 
changes in the population’s attitude on the topic (Glenn 1974; Cutler and Kaufman 1975). 
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complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the law” (527; see also Grant et al. 
2001, Henningham 1996). The effect of interest here is not that the population as a whole 
becomes more conservative over time (a period effect), nor that each generation is more liberal 
than the last (a cohort effect); the point is that in each generation a given individual who is liberal 
in her youth is likely to be more conservative when she is older (a life-cycle effect).35 Several 
longitudinal studies support this claim. Marwell et al. (1987) performed a longitudinal study on 
liberal activists from the 1960s that identified a lessening of liberal attitudes on questions of non-
violence and civil disobedience over twenty years. Konty and Dunham (1997) found a shift 
toward conservatism in attitudes about the importance of law and order and U.S. power. Studies 
like these supply us with evidence that an individual’s political attitudes are likely to vary over 
the course of her lifetime. 
 We should be able to agree that the truth value of at least some of these contested moral 
questions in the political domain, such as whether the death penalty is ever an appropriate 
                                                 
35 Multiple studies conducted at different times over the last century (Eysenck 1975; Hewitt et al. 
1977; Feather 1978; Truett 1993; Riemann et al. 1992) have established a correlation between 
age and conservatism. This supports the claim that older people are consistently more 
conservative than younger people, but the phenomenon could be explained either by individuals 
becoming more conservative or by a cohort effect in which younger generations are always more 
liberal than older generations but each individual’s attitudes are constant. Some of differences in 
attitude undoubtedly are due to a cohort effect (see discussion in Sears 1981), but there is also 
evidence that greater conservatism in older people is in part due to variation in the attitudes of 
individuals. 
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punishment, does not vary as individuals in a population age. An individual whose belief on one 
of these political question changes over time does not think that her current view and her past or 
future view might both be correct.  
So what should we conclude from a pattern showing that the liberal beliefs of a young 
person are likely to be replaced with conflicting more conservative beliefs? Take a young person, 
Eloise, who believes that torture should never be used, no matter the context, and even if it 
would save lives. Faced with evidence that she is likely to abandon this belief later in life, should 
she revise her degree of confidence? As an older person who believes, contrary to her earlier 
position, that torture may be used under some conditions, what should she do when she learns 
about this trend in attitude change? Should the older Eloise also reduce confidence in her belief? 
The truth value of the proposition that torture is never permissible does not vary over the course 
of her life, yet for some of her life, she believes the proposition and for some, she does not. Thus, 
whether it is true or false that torture is never permissible, she knows that over the course of her 
life, she is in a poor epistemic situation with regard to the proposition that torture is never 
permissible—she does not track the truth of this proposition over the course of her life, and she 
does not obtain her attitudes about this proposition via a reliable process. So, whether it is in her 
youth or when she is older that she learns about a trend toward conservatism, she should reduce 
her confidence in her belief about the proposition that that torture is never permissible.  
Notice that we are able to reach this conclusion without taking a stance on whether 
torture is permissible, and the argument does not require a premise about particular causes of 
beliefs being irrelevant or distorting, nor processes being unreliable. In fact, we can infer from 
attitude hypervariability that her belief-forming process is unreliable or that there is some 
irrelevant factor influencing her attitudes. Thus, the argument from irrelevant factors avoids 
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normative assumptions that the arguments from unreliable processes and irrelevant factors rely 
on, but allows us to draw significant moral epistemological conclusions.  
A natural response to the argument applied in the Eloise case is to say that Eloise need 
not reduce confidence in her belief at one of these times if she can show that she is in a better 
epistemic position at that time than at times when she holds the conflicting belief. To do this 
would be to isolate the epistemic problem. The process that leads Eloise to beliefs about torture 
over the course of her life may be unreliable, but perhaps the process Eloise employs to develop 
her belief on this question when she is older, for instance, constitutes a reliable subprocess. If she 
could show this, she could retain her level of confidence in her belief that torture is never 
permissible. But until this has been done, she should reduce confidence in her belief no matter 
her age.  
In the case of moral-political questions on which one’s views are likely to vary over the 
life cycle, I think we lack a clear-cut reason to prefer political beliefs held when younger or vice 
versa. One might be inclined to think that people are in a superior epistemic position when they 
are older, for various reasons. One could appeal to a general epistemic principle that says that 
across domains one tends to get more accurate over time—maybe because one gains greater 
wisdom or acquires more evidence. Against such a general principle, there is also evidence from 
outside the moral domain that older people exhibit various biases that make them more likely 
make incorrect judgments on certain tasks (Glisky 2007). There are also differences between the 
cognitive capacities of younger and older people, such as greater inflexibility and changes in 
personality and emotional responses as one ages (Levenson 2000), whose general epistemic 
upshot is unclear.  
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Some might argue that one would be justified in the face of attitude hypervariability in 
simply maintaining confidence in whatever belief one happens to have at the moment. There is a 
position like this in the literature on peer disagreement; it has been argued that one may 
justifiably maintain one’s level of confidence in one’s belief in the face of peer disagreement 
(e.g., van Inwagen 1996; see discussion in Kelly 2005). It may be the case that in the face of peer 
disagreement one is entitled to give special weight to one’s own belief and may thereby be 
justified in maintaining one’s level of confidence. In the case I am discussing, though, the 
conflicting beliefs are held by the same individual at different times. It goes too far to say that 
one has an entitlement to give special weight to the belief one has at a particular moment when 
one knows that one’s own belief is highly likely to be different subsequently. 
So, for any moral proposition in the political domain whose truth value will not vary 
within one’s lifetime, if one is given the information that one’s beliefs about that proposition are 
likely to vary, and if one lacks a way to isolate the unreliability, the argument from inconsistent 
variability says that one does not track the truth of that proposition. This means, among other 
things, that both young liberals and older ex-liberals should reduce confidence in their beliefs 
about certain propositions related to punishment, authority, patriotism, pacifism, and threats to 
law and order.  
 
3.3.5.3 Attitude Hypervariability: Case 2: Variability in attitudes about punishment 
influenced by externally induced emotions  
 
A variety of externally induced emotions have been shown to influence moral beliefs (e.g., 
Tiedens and Linton 2001; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006, 2008; Strohminger et al. 2011; Conway 
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and Gawronski 2013). Polman et al. (2012) found that externally induced anger, guilt, or envy 
can affect moral judgments, such as judgments about the acceptability of speeding, tax dodging, 
or keeping a stolen bike, or how much subjects think others should donate to charity. Inducing a 
feeling of disgust from a source other than the vignette that subjects are asked to consider (for 
instance, via hypnotism) can also have an effect on subjects’ judgments about the vignette 
(Wheatley and Haidt 2005). Priming subjects to feel clean or pure can also influence moral 
judgments (Schnall et al. 2008a; Zhong et al. 2010; Helzer and Pizarro 2011).  
Here I will focus on the influence of externally induced emotions on judgments about 
punishment. To establish attitude hypervariability using information about the causes of one’s 
attitudes, one needs to show (1) that the process by which one forms a moral judgment produces 
different judgments depending on variation in some causal factor, (2) that that factor is likely to 
vary over the duration of interest, and (3) that the fact of the matter (if there is any) does not 
change over the duration of interest. In this case the three conditions are met in the following 
way: (1) varying externally induced emotions can produce variation in judgments about 
punishment, (2) emotional states vary regularly, and (3) how much punishment a person should 
receive for a given action does not vary over the times during which one might consider the case 
(for the same reason that led us to think in the example in the introduction that whether a 
prisoner in a particular case should be given parole does not vary).    
There is good reason to think that externally induced emotions influence people’s 
judgments in legal cases and in nonlegal contexts where people consider desert and punishment 
(Bandes and Blumenthal 2012). Goldberg et al. (1999) found that subjects primed to feel angry 
were more likely than other subjects to judge that individuals who committed harms should be 
punished harshly. They also found that angry subjects ignored intent when judging how much 
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punishment perpetrators should receive—only subjects’ anger level predicted their judgments of 
the level of punishment that the perpetrator should receive. Bright and Goodman-Delahunty 
(2006) and Feigenson et al. (2001) also identified effects of anger on juror judgments (See also 
Lerner et al. 1998; Maroney 2006).  
Externally induced emotions also influence several types of judgments that are likely to 
influence how much punishment subjects judge that a perpetrator should receive, such as 
judgments about whether a person is responsible or to blame for some harm, and judgments 
about the moral wrongness of various actions. For instance, Keltner et al. (1993) found that 
subjects that were angry judged an individual more responsible than impersonal circumstances 
for an act of harm; sad subjects judged impersonal circumstances more responsible than the 
individual for the act of harm. Polman et al. (2012) determined that externally induced anger led 
subjects to judge the actions of others more harshly and to judge their own actions less harshly 
than subjects who were not angry. Eskine et al. (2011) found that subjects who were induced to 
feel disgusted judged various actions, such as a man eating his dead dog, a congressman taking a 
bribe, and a person shoplifting, as more morally wrong than non-disgusted subjects did.  
It is plausible that externally induced emotions such as anger and disgust affect our 
judgments in such a way that if we considered the same description of a case on two different 
occasions, experiencing different emotions, we might make different judgments about the 
punishment that the perpetrator should receive. Furthermore, people should be able to agree that 
the truth value of the proposition that the subject considers in these cases will not vary over the 
time in which she considers the case; we do not usually expect the appropriate punishment in a 
given case to vary over the course of a day, for instance, yet the judgments one makes on the 
case could vary over a day as one’s emotions change. Thus, we have an inconsistency in the 
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level of variability of our attitudes on these questions and the truth value of the propositions, in 
the form of attitude hypervariability.  
My claim here is not that emotions are biasing or distorting such that having emotions 
present in one’s judgment formation process poses an epistemic problem; my argument does not 
require assumptions about whether particular causal influences are morally irrelevant or that 
one’s process is unreliable. This is in contrast to Greene’s (2008) debunking argument, which I 
discuss below, which involves as a premise that emotional processes are less reliable or that 
moral beliefs produced by an emotional process are less likely to be true than those produced by 
a nonemotional processes. 36 Rather, my argument requires only the premises that varying 
emotions can produce a change in judgment, that when making moral judgments about cases in 
ordinary life (and even in philosophy) our externally induced emotions are likely to vary, and 
that the truth value of the proposition in question is not varying over the time period in which we 
make judgments about the case. Consequently, we face an inconsistency in levels of variability 
in the form of attitude hypervariability, and we are thus in a poor epistemic situation with regard 
to propositions about appropriate punishment in particular cases.  
Here, as in the case of moral beliefs that change with age, there is a natural response. 
Even if variation in externally induced emotion produces variation in our judgment, and our 
                                                 
36 In his (2014) he develops a subtler argument for the unreliability of automatic processes as a 
result of their evolutionary history. In part his strategy consists of using less contentious 
normative assumptions about the moral relevance or irrelevance of certain factors to support 
premises about the moral relevance or irrelevance of other factors whose relevance is more 
contentious. 
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general process for making judgments about punishment is thus unreliable, one may argue that 
we can identify our erroneous punishment judgments by isolating the faulty part of our process. 
One could argue either that that one’s judgments produced by a process containing externally 
induced emotion or anger in particular are more likely to match, or, conversely, that one’s 
judgments formed in the absence of such emotion are more likely to match (see discussion in 
Feigenson 2010; Bandes and Blumenthal 2012).  
Again, showing the epistemic superiority of one or the other of these is hard to do 
without invoking assumptions about the moral relevance of features of the cases or the reliability 
of moral belief processes involving emotion. On the one hand, since the emotions in question 
here are externally induced, they are not inspired by the case, and so they cannot be tracking 
some morally relevant feature of the case (they are not tracking anything about the case)—this 
might lead one to think that processes involving emotions are unreliable. However, it is an open 
possibility that we are better at making moral judgments when we are emotional than when we 
are unemotional. Emotions affect our processing of the case and the saliency of different features 
of the case. Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) has argued that emotions can adversely narrow one’s 
attention; Allman and Woodward (2008) argue that emotions can sometimes usefully broaden 
one’s attention. Certain emotions might put us in a heightened state and help us be more attuned 
to morally relevant features of the case, or may make us process information more deliberatively, 
or make judgments faster, leading us to disregard irrelevant details. To settle the question of 
whether these effects of emotion help or hinder our judgments, though, we would need to make 
normative claims about which features of the cases are morally relevant and which details are 
irrelevant. Anger in particular appears to lead to more extensive processing in cases of injustice 
(Litvak et al. 2009). In the case of judgments about appropriate punishments, it is not implausible 
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to think that we make more just decisions when we are angry. In the absence of normative 
assumptions, the evidence here is not conclusive either for or against the claim that externally 
induced emotion or anger in particular help us make better moral judgments in general or in the 
specific case of judgments about punishment. 
Thus, because of the probability that variation in emotion will produce variation in our 
judgments about appropriate punishment in individual cases where the appropriate level of 
punishment does not vary, and it is not clear whether the presence of emotion makes us more 
likely to make correct judgments, we should reduce confidence in our judgments about 
punishment.  
3.3.5.4 Attitude Hypovariability: The Incorrigibility of Disgust 
 
Now I will propose a case of attitude hypovariability, where attitudes are insufficiently variable 
for them to be tracking moral propositions. In the simplest attitude hypovariability debunking 
argument, one has reason to think that the truth value of the moral proposition varies over the 
time period during which it would be useful to have matching attitudes about that proposition, 
and yet one is likely to either maintain a belief that p or lack a belief that p over the relevant 
period. Some possible cases might be extremely demanding or undemanding attitudes about 
duties that we have good reason to think are imperfect, such as maintenance of a belief in the 
proposition that one ought to give away large sums of money over a time period that includes 
time when one is not capable of giving away large sums of money; the proposition that a group 
of people warrants assistance over some long duration (a span of time during which one expects 
that people are sometimes in need and sometimes not), or that a group of people warrants some 
set amount of aid over a duration in which the number of people in the group varies substantially 
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(along the lines of Bloom’s argument, which assumed that the number of people suffering makes 
a difference to how much assistance should be given them); or that someone is a good person (if 
one allows for the possibility that the person’s character could change). However, I am not 
currently confident about any of these assumptions. So I will examine a different sort of case.  
The case I am using here is the case of moral beliefs that were formed as a result of 
disgust (whether the disgust extraneous or inspired by features of the case or vignette itself). This 
case is a somewhat more complicated example of attitude hypovariability than the simplest case 
that I just described, because in this case the hypovariability of attitudes is not in tension with 
what we know about variation in the truth value of the moral proposition but rather what we 
know about variation in the factors that produce the disgust: though the truth value of the 
proposition may not vary over the relevant time period, when the factor that led one to feel 
disgust toward the object varies, one’s disgust reaction is unlikely to vary, meaning that, once 
activated, one’s disgust is not sensitive with regard to that factor—disgust is still likely to be 
active in the absence of the factor. If disgust is to produce truth tracking moral judgments, 
whatever triggers it must be morally relevant. Even if disgust is not activated in the absence of 
these morally relevant factors (and so, prior to activation, may be sensitive), and even if it is 
activated in the presence of these morally relevant factors (and so may be adherent), once 
activated, disgust is no longer sensitive to that factor. Moral beliefs that are the product of 
disgust, then, cannot be trusted to be tracking the varying considerations they would presumably 
need to be tracking if they were tracking moral propositions.37  
                                                 
37 One might not take this by itself to be reason for concern: even if one is clearly insensitive 
with regard to some factor, and so not tracking the truth value of the proposition, one could 
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As I mentioned in the previous section, there is evidence that a person’s level of disgust 
can affect his or her moral judgments on a variety of questions (Haidt and Hersh 2001; Wheatley 
and Haidt 2005; Schnall et al. 2008; Horberg et al. 2009; Inbar et al. 2009; Zhong et al. 2010; 
Helzer and Pizarro 2011; Chapman and Anderson 2013; Jones and Fitness 2008; however, see 
also May 2014 and Landy and Goodwin forthcoming for objections). Two key features of 
disgust are the following: First, entities that we consider disgusting can contaminate other 
entities that become associated with them—disgustingness can be transmitted quite easily to 
things we did not previously consider disgusting. Second, once one associates disgust with an 
entity it is hard to stop thinking of that entity as disgusting even when the situation changes or 
when one acquires new evidence. Together, we can call these two features of disgustingness 
stickiness—disgustingness is easily transmitted between entities, and once disgustingness is 
attached to an entity it is hard to revise that association. To support my attitude hypovariability 
argument in the case of disgust, I appeal to the incorrigibility of moral beliefs influenced by 
disgust. In the next section, I will construct a different debunking argument that appeals to the 
transmissibility feature of disgust.    
Classic cases that support the stickiness of disgust judgments include subjects’ 
unwillingness to drink juice stirred with a new comb or a sterilized cockroach, and unwillingness 
                                                                                                                                                             
nonetheless be quite confident that the proposition is true (as one believes) and that the truth 
value of the proposition varies little, and so one could simply be grateful that one happens to 
have a matching attitude about that proposition. However, disgust also has a property of 
transmissibility that I will use in the next section to develop a distinct debunking argument that 
should undermine one’s confidence that the proposition is true. 
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to wear the clothes of an amputee (Rozin et al. 1994). One might want to object that these are 
nonmoral contexts, and that perhaps disgust is not sticky in the same way in moral contexts. 
However, there is reason to think that the stickiness of disgust extends to putatively moral 
contexts as well. On the incorrigibility side, Haidt’s work on moral dumbfounding suggests the 
difficulty people have in revising both their disgust response and their resulting moral judgments 
about a variety of cases, such as ostensibly harm-free incest (Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy 
1999). On the transmissibility side, studies showed hesitancy on the part of subjects to wear 
clothing that previously belonged to a convicted murderer (Rozin et al. 1994). 
Admittedly, there is some evidence showing that people can overcome or moderate the 
influence of disgust on their moral judgments (Haidt et al. 1993). This does not undermine the 
idea that people should distrust their moral beliefs influenced by disgust; it just means that some 
people are able to overcome the influence of disgust, which means that their moral judgments 
end up not being influenced by disgust. More pertinent is the evidence showing that in some 
contexts some people can revise their disgust associations, making disgust less incorrigible than I 
have suggested. If there is variation in disgust’s stickiness across individuals, then my point is 
that individuals whose disgust tends to behave in a stickier manner should be more wary than 
those whose disgust is less sticky. Also, whether disgust exhibits stickiness in the same way 
across contexts may be disputed. Strohminger (2014) argues that disgust constitutes a 
“psychological nebula,” with overlapping but diverse functions in different contexts; for that 
reason there may be different degrees of stickiness in different contexts. What will matter for my 
arguments is whether disgust is sticky within moral contexts.  
I argue that the incorrigibility of disgust means that moral beliefs that are formed by a 
process involving a disgust reaction are too resistant to modification to be sensitive to changes in 
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the factors that inspire disgust to begin with. Setting aside whether any of the things that inspire 
disgust are actually morally wrong, for disgust to track moral wrongness it would need to be 
corrigible in the face of the realization that the factor that produced the disgust about the object 
was not in fact present or is no longer present—e.g. learning that a sweater was not worn by 
Hitler, or that someone did not do the evil deed they were accused of, etc. Given the difficulty 
we have dissociating feelings of disgust from entities and actions once we have begun to feel 
disgust toward them, our moral beliefs influenced by disgust cannot be tracking morally relevant 
features of the world. Thus, one of the properties of disgust makes it unlikely that the moral 
beliefs it produces are truth tracking. 
This argument does not involve claims about what things should be treated as disgusting, 
what features of the world are morally relevant, or what sorts of things are likely to be right or 
wrong, which is what makes the argument unusual. It does involve denying certain types of 
constitutive relationship between feeling disgust toward an action and that action being wrong, 
but the specific constitutive relation that would be required is something few want to endorse.38 
It is possible that there are other causes of moral beliefs that also have this property of 
being incorrigible that is passed on to moral beliefs and that is inconsistent with the possibility of 
those beliefs tracking truth. For instance, anger and contempt are often difficult to eradicate even 
in the face of many different types of new information—perhaps they too are inappropriately 
incorrigible, producing attitude hypovariability, and a similar debunking argument could be 
                                                 
38 Although Kass claims that disgust can serve as a signal of moral wrongness, he does not claim 
that a feeling of disgust in response to something makes that thing bad or wrong. However, 
Prinz’s view may involve this sort of constitutive relation between emotion and moral fact. 
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constructed for moral beliefs influenced by such emotions. Correspondingly, there may be 
processes that produce moral beliefs that are subsequently too easily lost to be tracking whatever 
activated them.  
Kelly (2010, 2014) elucidated the two features of disgustingness that I am calling 
stickiness and used them for moral epistemological purposes, reaching the same conclusion that I 
am advancing, that disgust is an unreliable influence on moral beliefs. However, his 
argumentative strategy is different from the one I am proposing. In my view, there are four 
distinct arguments Kelly employs to support his conclusion that disgust is problematic in such a 
way that “we should disregard, discount or discredit those intuitions and be suspicious of the 
judgments that they influence, to the extent that we can” (Kelly 2014, 137). 
One argument relies on the assumption that poisons and parasites are not morally 
relevant. For instance, Kelly says, “a large part of what disgust properly responds to has nothing 
to do with morality but is a reaction to cues likely to mark poisons and parasites” (2011, 147). 
Elsewhere, Kelly and Morar write, “a large number of cues that have nothing to do with 
highfaluting moral issues also activate disgust, namely those associated with poisons and 
parasites” (2014, 22). Behind these claims is an assumption about the sorts of considerations that 
are moral—at the least, there is an assumption that poisons and parasites are not morally relevant 
things to track. (One way to justify this would be if Kelly were working with the assumption that 
the moral facts are quite similar to the social norms that we have, which could then license this 
assumption that poisons and parasites are morally irrelevant.) This argument appears to be a 
variety of argument from morally irrelevant factors. Schafer discusses this type of argument, 
noting that one may conclude that a particular influence is unreliable because it responds to 
features of the world that we think are morally irrelevant. For instance, we may consider beliefs 
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cause by disgust to be an unreliable cause because it is influenced by things (cleanliness and 
purity) that we take to be morally irrelevant (477).39 This strategy for assessing reliability, 
though, requires that we employ some normative assumptions about features of the world being 
morally irrelevant (even if in this case they are not the most controversial features).  
A second argument suggested by Kelly’s work might be interpreted as somewhat similar 
to the malfunctioning component argument that I introduced above, except that its method for 
showing that the component of the moral judgment process is unreliable at detecting what it 
would have to detect if it were to help one track the moral truth is to show that the component 
was designed for a purpose different from the one it would need to serve to promote truth 
tracking. Kelly provides an evolutionary story about disgust, according to which disgust evolved 
to help humans avoid poisons and parasites via initially distinct mechanisms that become 
functionally integrated (2011). Subsequently, disgust was co-opted to serve a second function, 
that is, to help regulate social interactions, especially by identifying group boundaries and social 
norms (Kelly and Morar 2014, 4). The proposal is that the disgust reaction retains many of the 
features that promote poison and parasite avoidance. If we assume that social norms roughly 
reflect the moral truths, we could conclude that moral beliefs produced by our disgust system are 
unreliable if the disgust system is not reliable at producing moral beliefs that match social norms. 
This latter claim would be supported mainly not by looking at the behavior of our disgust system 
and showing that the beliefs it produces regularly fail to match social norms; rather the main 
source of support for the claim is that because the disgust system was initially evolved for one 
                                                 
39 This is similar to Prinz taking empathy to be a poor guide to moral judgments because it is not 
responsive to considerations that are morally relevant. 
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purpose it is unlikely to be as reliable at the second, distinct purpose it was put to. Here the 
epistemic problem is posed by the fact that our disgust faculty is tracking social norms 
imperfectly. On the assumption that social norms are roughly correct, this gives us a debunking 
argument. However, it would be better to support the claim that our disgust system does not 
reliably track social norms with evidence about actual mismatches between social norms and 
disgust-influenced moral judgments than with evidence showing that moral disgust faculties are 
a byproduct of a system that initially was tracking one thing and is now tracking another. This 
evolutionary evidence surely increases our estimation of the probability that disgust fails to track 
social norms but a look at how our disgust system actually behaves—a look at the proximal 
process we ended up with—would be a better source of evidence.  
Third, Kelly argues that the disgust process is trigger sensitive or is biased toward being 
better safe than sorry with respect to detecting dangers, producing a high proportion of false 
positives; he infers from that that the system is likely to have the same bias with respect to moral 
judgments (2011, 147). We cannot make this inference, though, without a sense of the relation 
between poisons and parasites and moral properties, or a sense of the distribution of moral 
properties in the world.40 (For instance, if we are surrounded by evil things that should be 
avoided, a hyperactive disgust system might be responding to the numerous bad things 
surrounding us and not producing many false positives; or if poisons and parasites are morally 
neutral, there is no reason to think disgust reactions is producing false positives; or if avoiding 
                                                 
40 Schafer highlights the value of background knowledge about the distribution the normative 
properties in the world when trying to indirectly assess reliability of normative process (2010, 
478). 
 88 
people with pathologies is far worse than putting oneself in circumstances where one is harmed, 
then disgust would certainly not be a better safe than sorry guide to the sorts of actions one ought 
to take.) The fact that disgust is better safe than sorry with respect to dangers does not mean that 
it also has a better safe than sorry bias with respect to other things. A system could well be 
disposed to produce a high proportion of false positives with respect to one thing but produce a 
low proportion of false negatives with respect to a second thing. Again, if the moral facts turn 
out to correspond to our social norms, we could perhaps assess empirically whether disgust 
produces many false positives with regard to social norms or we could compare features of social 
norms with features of poisons and parasites to assess whether production of false positives with 
regard to the latter would be associated with false positives with regard to the former if the same 
system was used for both.  
Each of these three arguments suggested in Kelly’s work involves reliance on normative 
assumptions or is unconvincing. The attitude hypovariability argument from the incorrigibility of 
disgust is meant to lead us to the conclusion that we should decrease confidence in moral beliefs 
influenced by disgust while making fewer normative assumptions and avoid the other problems 
encountered above. 
In this section, I have formulated a debunking argument from inconsistent variability. 
The argument emerges from a strategy for assessing the epistemic status of beliefs in which we 
compare the levels of variability between attitudes and the truth value of a proposition. Such a 
comparison can result in three findings—that the level of variability in one’s attitudes is 
consistent with the level of variability we expect in the truth value of the proposition; that the 
level of variability in one’s attitudes is higher than that in the truth value of the proposition 
(attitude hypervariability); or that the level of variability in one’s beliefs is lower than that of the 
 89 
truth value of the proposition (attitude hypovariability). The first is consistent with us being in a 
good epistemic position; the last two indicate that we are in a poor epistemic position. I have 
shown that this strategy has particular value in the moral domain, where the argument from 
inconsistent variability allows us to draw epistemic conclusions without making the substantial 
assumptions that other debunking arguments make about the moral irrelevance of causal factors 
or the unreliability of one’s process. Applying the attitude hypervariability argument to two types 
of moral beliefs, I have shown that certain political beliefs are not tracking the truth because they 
are likely to change as one ages, and that judgments about punishment do not track the truth 
because they are vulnerable to influence from emotions. In each case our attitudes vary more 
than the truth value of the propositions, and so we do not track the truth with regard to these 
propositions. Applying the attitude hypovariability argument to the case of moral beliefs 
influenced by disgust, I argued that the incorrigibility feature of disgust makes moral beliefs that 
are the product of disgust too invariant to be tracking the truth of moral propositions. 
Consequently, we should reduce confidence in these types of beliefs.  
3.3.6 The Inappropriately Improbable Belief Argument 
The argument I discussed in the previous section, the inconsistent variability argument, has to do 
with whether the rates of variation of attitude and truth value of a proposition over some period 
of time are compatible. The epistemic problem is produced by incompatibilities in actual, 
observed rates of variation or anticipated levels of variation over a period of time. Information 
about causes can inform that type of argument by informing our estimations of probable 
variation in attitudes. By contrast, my third debunking argument, the inappropriately improbable 
belief argument, which I will now discuss, has to do with the idea that subject S, who believes p, 
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could have easily believed ~p, and the circumstances in which this is epistemically problematic. 
This argument is importantly distinct from the inconsistent variability argument, though it has 
some similarities. The problem arises in conditions where the truth value of the proposition of 
interest is static over the relevant period of time. Again, though, we do not need to make an 
assumption about what that truth value of the proposition is.  
The inappropriately improbable belief argument offers an explication of a familiar 
epistemic concern: the idea that one could have easily lacked one’s belief or that one’s belief 
could have easily been different.41 A key premise in this argument, though it is frequently not 
made explicit in other efforts to characterize the problem, is that in the range of circumstances in 
which one was likely to have a different attitude about p, the truth value of p was unlikely to 
have been different.  
We assess the probability that we could have believed otherwise in various ways. Peer 
disagreement can be evidence that one could have more or less easily believed something 
different. Information about the causes of beliefs can also be used to inform an estimate of the 
probability that we will believe the proposition. 
I will begin by examining the epistemic problems we can identify in a case in which one 
is equally likely to believe p and ~p. Then I will examine the case in which one believes p but 
one was unlikely to believe p, which is a situation that has attracted much attention in the 
debunking literature.  
                                                 
41 This argument is closely related to discussions of what varieties of luck prevent a belief from 
being justified or constituting knowledge, but I will not be able to explore this relationship here. 
Dunaway (ms) discusses this sort of argument. 
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3.3.7 Equiprobable beliefs 
Suppose S is presented with proposition p. In the range of circumstances where S is likely to 
form beliefs about p, p has the same truth value. Given what she knows about the causes that 
influence her attitude on this kind of proposition, S finds that she had a .5 probability of 
believing p and a .5 probability of believing ~p.42 (Suppose that once she forms her belief about 
p, she retains it over the duration of interest). S can infer that she does not have a high 
probability of believing p given p, or a high probability of not believing p given ~p. In other 
words, regardless of the truth value of p, and regardless of which belief she happens to have, S 
can infer that she is not adherent or sensitive with regard to this proposition.  
A toy case to illustrate this is that you could tell that a person’s process for taking a 
multiple choice exam is not truth tracking, even though you do not know what the correct answer 
is, if you know they have an equal chance of choosing each option, when only one can be 
correct.  
3.3.8 Highly improbable belief 
Now consider a case where S believes p but was very unlikely to believe p. S takes herself to 
have an entitlement to her belief that p and she believes that she is sensitive and adherence with 
regard to p. Again, suppose that in the range of circumstances where S is likely to form beliefs 
                                                 
42 S knows this because e.g. she is sure to use some method, and many people use this method 
and 50% believe p, or S has used this method for similar propositions in the past and 50% of the 
time she believed the proposition, etc. 
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about p, p has the same truth value, and that once S acquires a belief about p, she will maintain it 
over the time period of interest. Here I have in mind basic moral propositions, such as that pain is 
generally bad, or that purity is to be pursued, that are not inferred from other beliefs. Now, S 
discovers that although she believes p, the causal process that produced her attitude about p was 
highly unlikely to make her believe p. In this case, S cannot maintain that her belief is true 
without acknowledging that she is not adherent with regard to p.   
To illustrate this argument I will return to the case of moral beliefs influenced by disgust. 
Earlier I highlighted that the incorrigibility feature of disgust means that moral beliefs influenced 
by disgust may be insensitive. Here I want to appeal to the transmissibility feature of 
disgustingness.  
Humans are disposed to feel disgust in response to outgroups. If a person feels disgust in 
response to a particular outgroup, she might come to associate disgust with various traditions that 
the outgroup engages in—whatever those traditions are—and symbols associated with the 
group—whatever those symbols are—leading her to classify those traditions and symbols as 
wrong or to be avoided. Or, if one feels disgust at the thought of eating a particular food (e.g. 
squid, dogs, insects), one may come to feel disgust toward whatever group of people eats that 
food. As Kelly observes, “Certain activities and the people who engage in them can become 
disgusting, as can entire groups of people, the values and norms that bind them together, and the 
symbols that indicate membership in the group itself. For instance, in the United States, devoted 
Democrats might find distinctively Republican policies, values, and iconography disgusting, and 
vice versa)” (Kelly 2011, 144).  Kelly and Morar discuss a case described in Henrich et al. 
(2010), an anthropological example about coming of age rituals in neighboring tribes, that might 
illustrate this phenomenon: “the Etoro believe that for a boy to achieve manhood he must ingest 
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the semen of his elders. This is accomplished through ritualized rites of passage that require 
young male initiates to fellate a senior member (Herdt 1984/1993; Kelley 1980). In contrast, the 
nearby Kaluli maintain that male initiation is only properly done by ritually delivering the semen 
through the initiate’s anus, not his mouth. The Etoro revile these Kaluli practices, finding them 
disgusting” (61). Presumably, each group condemns the other’s practices because they are 
performed by the outside group.  
I claim that the transmissibility feature of disgustingness produces some moral beliefs 
that are inappropriately improbable. If S only believes that an action is morally wrong because 
she feels disgust toward it, and she acquired that disgust as a result of an improbable association 
between that action and something else toward which S felt disgust, her moral belief is 
improbable. For instance, if S feels disgust toward the burial practices of another group and 
comes to feel disgust toward and condemn as wrong a completely unrelated practice of the 
outgroup, such as their polygamy. Supposing that the truth value of proposition that the action is 
wrong is the same in the range of situations where it would be useful for S to have a matching 
attitude about whether the action is wrong, S’s belief that p, if true, is not adherent. Some might 
maintain that S still has knowledge, even though she is not adherent because adherence is not 
required for knowledge. Even if this is so, I claim that S is in an epistemic situation that is poor 
in the sense that should concern us: S has some goal she wants to achieve, such as accomplishing 
an obligation where it would be helpful to having a matching attitude about whether it is bad to 
take some action. S cannot simultaneously retain her defeasible assumption that her belief is true, 
and acknowledge that if her belief is true it is the product of a nonadherent process.  
Note that we are still talking about proximal psychological and developmental causes 
here: the idea is that S’s psychological processes did not make her likely to believe p. Now, this 
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argument is different from the problem that one’s belief could have easily been false, 43 and from 
the problem posed if we lack a reason to think our higher order process (evolution) was tracking 
anything morally relevant (what Schafer terms arguments from insensitivity) or if we have a 
reason to think our higher order process was tracking something morally irrelevant (e.g. 
fittedness to one’s environment).  
 This argument does resemble what Schafer calls the arguments from frequency, 
depending on how this type of argument is understood. One way to understand the argument says 
that there are many different normative processes that evolution could have plausibly produced, 
and few possible reliable normative processes (e.g. because, without making an assumption 
about which moral system is correct, we assume there is just one or a few correct moral system), 
and so it is very unlikely that evolution would have produced a reliable one. Thus we have no 
more reason to think the process we ended up with is reliable than any other process we might 
have evolved; none of them is likely to be reliable. That argument is distinct from my 
inappropriately improbable belief argument, because it does not start with or address the prima 
facie assumption that our moral system is roughly correct. This argument certainly may be 
vulnerable to Schafer’s second objection that it does not overcome the defeasible assumption that 
our normative faculty is reliable, described below.  
Another interpretation of the argument is that there are many different normative 
processes that evolution could have produced, and it was unlikely we would end up with a 
                                                 
43 Bedke (2014) discusses the problem posed by the range of moral facts that are conceptually 
possible, and he notes that Street (2008) mentions this as part of her presentation of the 
Darwinian Dilemma. 
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reliable one because we take our current normative process to be reliable, and obtaining this 
particular process that we have was improbable. This argument is similar to what I have called 
the argument from inappropriately improbable belief, but applied at a higher order, about the 
improbability of obtaining the proximal faculty we have. I introduced the argument as applying 
to a case where proximal causes make S’s belief, which S initially took to be true and the product 
of a truth tracking process, improbable. In the inappropriately improbable belief argument we 
reached the conclusion that there is substantial tension in maintaining that one’s belief is true and 
acknowledging that one is not adherent with respect to that proposition. This second 
interpretation of Schafer’s portrayal of this skeptical argument says the evolutionary process was 
unlikely to produce the normative faculties that we actually have. I will advance this sort of 
higher order version of the argument from inappropriately improbable belief in the next chapter, 
when I argue that the improbability of evolving the specific fairness normative faculty that we 
have is in tension with the prima facie assumption that the faculty is reliable in a way that 
undermines our reason for thinking the faculty tracks truth.  
Schafer characterizes two objections to the Arguments from Frequency—first, that 
evolutionary findings suggests humans were very likely to have evolved normative faculties 
sensitive to the things our current normative faculties respond to, such as pain and reciprocity. 
This is certainly an important objection to the second interpretation of the argument, and I will 
address it in the next chapter. The second objection is the reminder that to avoid begging the 
question against the realist, the skeptic has to start out assuming that we have “some sort of a 
priori entitlement to trust both our normative and our perceptual faculties” (482). Schafer writes, 
“Now, consider the set of all the possible normative faculties of any sort. Surely, in this broad 
class of normative faculties, most possible normative faculties will be not terribly reliable, by our 
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current lights. Thus, our a priori entitlement to trust our own normative faculties must amount to 
an entitlement to treat them as more reliable than those of an arbitrarily chosen creature. But if 
we have a general entitlement of this sort, why shouldn’t we also be entitled to regard our 
normative faculties as more reliable than those of an arbitrarily chosen product of evolution? 
After all, this latter entitlement is simply a restricted version of the former—an entitlement that 
we are taking for granted here” (482-483). So, if the a priori entitlement was enough to overcome 
worries produced by the point that numerous other normative faculties were possible, the idea is 
that it should be enough to overcome the worry produced by the point that humans could have 
easily evolved different normative process. The difference between these two worries, though, is 
similar to the difference between doubting one’s belief because one realizes it might have been 
produced by a demon and so one could have easily believed something else, and doubting one’s 
belief because one has good empirical evidence that one’s belief is (proximally) the product of a 
psychological process that was likely to produce a different belief, or (distally) the product of an 
evolutionary process that empirical evidence says was likely to produce a different moral 
psychology.   
In this section, I have introduced characterized two ways in which the improbability of a 
belief may indicate that one is not tracking the truth of the proposition—a situation in one was as 
likely to hold the belief as not and a situation in which one was unlikely to hold the belief. For 
either situation to reveal an epistemic problem, one must have reason to think that truth value of 
the proposition is static over the relevant contexts and one will retain one’s belief over the period 
of interest. For the second situation, it must also be the case that one’s only reason for belief 
comes from a prima facie entitlement to hold beliefs produced by the faculty it came from or an 
assumption that the belief is the produce of a truth tracking process. Discovering that if one’s 
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belief is true, then one’s faculty is nonadherent undermines one’s entitlement to trust beliefs 
produced by that faculty and thereby one’s reason for believing p.44  
3.4 OBJECTIONS 
A general objection to these arguments is that the example psychological processes I have 
chosen are not the right processes to look at for an assessment of whether the moral beliefs they 
influence are tracking truth. Rather, it is some other process, such as the process of wide 
reflective equilibrium or conscious reflection, for instance, that ultimately determines whether 
we track moral truth. Perhaps, my opponent might suggest, processes related to disgust and 
sympathy merely feed into a broader process that weighs the various considerations and issues a 
conclusion: the disgust process might well be unreliable, but if reflective equilibrium or some 
other higher level process counteracts this unreliability, disgust may influence moral beliefs 
without being a cause for concern. Even if the empirical evidence shows that moral actions and 
expressed judgments are sometimes influenced by disgust, my opponent might argue in such 
cases the more reliable process of reflective equilibrium just failed to engage. In other words, 
                                                 
44 However, my opponent might maintain that even if one’s process were shown not to be truth 
tracking, one may nonetheless have reason to retain one’s belief on the subject. If this is one’s 
position, I think it is worth pointing out that although one will retain that true belief through the 
relevant time period, if this un-truth tracking process is operating in other contexts that one cares 
about, such as the moral beliefs of the next generation, one must acknowledge that those people 
are very unlikely to have true beliefs on the topic. 
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perhaps I have mischaracterized the relevant proximal process.  
My view on this is that it is worth investigating what information we have that could bear 
on whether the process of reflective equilibrium (or any other candidate broader proximal 
process) is in fact reliable. It is also important to investigate how frequently this more reliable 
broader process is actually employed. If we possess this reliable process of reflective equilibrium 
but we employ it very rarely, then the broader process by which we reach our moral beliefs is not 
very reliable. We might maintain the hope that perhaps we can revise our current practice and 
use reflective equilibrium more frequently, but the fact would remain that as things stand we are 
not tracking the truth. My aim has been not to show that moral knowledge, justification, or truth 
tracking is not possible, but rather that we should reduce confidence in significant subsets of the 
moral beliefs that we currently have—namely, those types of moral beliefs that suffer from the 
problems that I have characterized in this chapter.   
3.5 THE SCOPE OF DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS 
In each of these arguments, information about a proximal process can be used to support the 
conclusion that moral beliefs obtained via that process are not truth tracking. We need not look at 
the evolutionary origins of disgust or sympathy to inform our conclusion that moral beliefs 
produced by these processes track the truth.  
One reason people might be inclined to focus on information about the evolutionary 
origins of moral beliefs is the thought that if we could assess the reliability of evolution at 
producing reliable normative faculties, we could draw general conclusions about whether we 
track moral facts, because the influence of evolution is so wide-reaching—all moral beliefs are in 
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some sense caused distally by evolution. By contrast, it is reasonable to think that certain 
proximal causes, such as disgust and sympathy, influence only subsets of our moral beliefs. For 
this reason, by targeting only moral beliefs subject to influence by disgust or sympathy, the 
debunking arguments I have offered are of limited scope. Kelly (2014) has characterized these 
debunking arguments of narrow scope as “selective debunking arguments.”  
In principle, though, one could supply proximal debunking arguments that apply to all 
moral beliefs: if there are certain components that all moral beliefs production processes share, 
then determining that those components were unreliable would permit a global rather than 
selective proximal debunking argument. For instance, some have claimed that disgust is the basic 
moral emotion, that it does not influence purity and sanctity violations alone but rather underlies 
all our moral beliefs. If this were true and if my argument about the unreliability of disgust were 
true, we would have reason to distrust many or all of our moral beliefs. I suspect that as a matter 
of fact there is substantial diversity in the processes that produce different types of moral beliefs 
and so we will need to assess each process and thus each subset of moral beliefs separately, but 
this is an empirical question.  At the same time, it is important to note that if we have distinct 
evolutionary stories for different types of moral beliefs (e.g. one evolutionary explanation for 
justice and fairness norms and another for purity norms), we can have distal debunking 
arguments that are themselves of only limited scope.45 In the next chapter, I will formulate a 
distal debunking argument that applies only to beliefs about the fair distribution of resources. 
                                                 
45 See Kelly (2014) for discussion of selective debunking arguments and an example of what I 
would characterize as an evolutionary debunking argument of limited scope. 
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Thus, proximal debunking arguments need not always be of narrower scope than evolutionary 
debunking arguments. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
I have proposed three distinct debunking arguments that reach epistemological conclusions using 
information about the psychological and biological causes of moral beliefs. I illustrated each 
argument with a distinct type of moral belief. The properties of those proximal causes alone 
license conclusions about the epistemic status of the beliefs they influence: a moral belief does 
not track the truth if it hinges on sympathy activation, is influenced by disgust, is a certain sort of 
moral political belief likely to change over one’s lifetime, or is a judgment about punishment that 
is vulnerable to the influence of emotions that are likely to vary. 
Here is a summary of the relationship between the three arguments I have introduced: if 
we know that the truth value of a proposition is static across the conditions in which it is valuable 
for us to match it, then to have a high probability of matching the truth value of the proposition, 
one should hope to have (1) a high probability that one’s attitudes about that proposition over the 
relevant period of time are also static, (2) a high probability that one believes p or a high 
probability that one does not believe p—not an equal probability, and (3) the attitude that is the 
probable one. If one violates (1) and one is likely to have varying attitudes about p, one can 
construct an attitude hypervariability argument. If one meets (1) but violates (2), so one’s 
attitudes are likely to be static over the relevant period, but one is equally likely to believe p as 
~p, one can construct an inappropriately belief argument due to equiprobability. If one meets (2), 
but does not meet (3), so e.g. one believes p, but one was very unlikely to believe p, one can 
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construct an inappropriately improbable belief argument due to inconsistency. If one knows that 
the truth value of a proposition is likely to vary over the time period of interest, and one knows 
that one’s attitudes about the proposition are likely to be static over significant portions of that 
time period, one can construct an argument from attitude hypovariability. If one can identify the 
factor in the world that a component of a process would need to be picking out in order for it to 
contribute to the process tracking the truth of some moral proposition, and one can show that the 
component of the process does not in fact perform that function or does not do it sufficiently 
well, one can advance a malfunctioning component debunking argument.  
The malfunctioning component argument employs information about a component of the 
causal process that produces attitudes. The inconsistent variability argument employs 
information about causes to estimate patterns of variation in one’s attitudes about a proposition. 
The inappropriately improbable belief argument similarly employs information about causes to 
judge the probability that one would obtain the attitude one has. Thus, I have characterized three 
distinct ways that information about the causes of one’s beliefs can inform our assessment of the 
epistemic status of those beliefs.  
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4.0  THE DISTAL CAUSES OF FAIRNESS NORMS  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the inappropriately improbable belief debunking argument. 
This argument says that S believes p but S was unlikely to believe p given the psychological 
process she uses to make judgments about propositions like p. When various other conditions 
hold, the improbability of this belief should lead S to reduce confidence in it. As I suggested at 
the end of the previous chapter, we can advance this argument at a higher order—at the 
developmental level, we can say that S believes p via a psychological process that makes her 
likely to believe p, but she was unlikely to obtain that process, developmentally. And one can 
construct this argument at a third level, as I will do in this chapter: even if S believes that p, was 
likely to believe that p given her psychological faculties, and was likely to develop those 
psychological faculties, one can construct a debunking argument on the basis of the fact that 
although humans were unlikely to have evolved those developmental and psychological 
processes. When certain other conditions hold, I claim that humans like S who are in this 
situation should reduce confidence in their belief that p.  
In this chapter, I apply the inappropriately improbable process argument to show how 
information about the distal origins of fairness beliefs can contribute to our assessment of 
whether our beliefs about fairness norms track the truth. I argue that even if our empirical 
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information about the proximal psychological and developmental processes that result in 
intuitions about fair distribution of resources is consistent with the possibility that we track the 
truth of these propositions, information about their distal evolutionary origins should undermine 
our reason for belief. I will examine what we know about the proximal and developmental 
sources of these intuitions, to assess if they can support a conclusion about whether we track the 
truth. Then I will turn to the distal origins of these processes, and argue that humans were 
reasonably likely to not evolve the fairness belief processes they have. It is plausible that human 
beings with beliefs about fair distributions of resources could have had different sets of beliefs 
about how resources should be distributed. If we further assume that the truth value of any 
fairness norms that may exist would be the same in the different conditions where humans might 
have evolved different fairness belief processes, this improbability of the specific fairness 
processes that humans have is in tension with humans having a reason to think that they track the 
truth.  
First I discuss the nature of the fairness intuitions that are the target of my argument. 
Then I describe some of the empirical research on beliefs about fairness norms in adults. I 
discuss some of the evidence we have on the sorts of proximal factors that influence judgments 
about fairness, concluding that it may be consistent with some of our fairness beliefs tracking the 
truth. Then I describe some research on the ontogeny of fairness beliefs, which is consistent with 
the possibility that Westerners track the truth. Finally, I look at what we know about the 
evolutionary origins of the fairness norms that humans have, as well as the conditions under 
which various norms related to fairness could evolve. I show that on a realist view of metaethics, 
this empirical evidence that the fairness process we have was unlikely to evolve undermines any 
prima facie assumption that our process for making fairness judgments is truth tracking. I then 
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discuss objections to my argument. 
4.2 THE INAPPROPRIATELY IMPROBABLE PROCESS ARGUMENT 
Here is a fictional case to illustrate the inappropriately improbable process argument: Suppose 
there is a society where all the members have beliefs about objects in ordinary life having a 
property they call “halo-ness.” They cannot empirically test whether this property is present, and 
they cannot infer the presence of halo-ness from other properties they perceive the objects to 
have, but they have very strong beliefs about whether it is present in any given object. They 
believe that this property is inherent in the object and that most adults can reliably detect it. They 
treat objects with halo-ness differently than those without. They assume that their ability to 
detect this property is reliable, since their other belief-forming processes are usually reliable. All 
this seems reasonable. Then they learn via divine revelation, which is another process that they 
trust, that when God gave them this process for detecting halo-ness, he considered all the objects 
in the world and rolled dice to decide which ones their halo-detection process would pick out as 
having halo-ness. With this revelation the people should become much less confident that there 
is any such thing as halo-ness. If there is such a thing as halo-ness, it is also completely unclear 
which objects possess it. The improbability of the population ending up with a halo process that 
picks out the objects it does, given their belief that halo-ness is something inherent in objects, 
should undermine these people’s prima facie assumption that their halo process is reliable or that 
they track the truth with regard to halo-ness, if there is any such thing. They should reduce 
confidence in their beliefs about halo-ness.  
The inappropriately improbable process argument says for a belief (or domain of beliefs), 
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even if an individual was likely given her psychological faculties to hold the belief she does, and 
even if she was likely to develop those psychological faculties, she lacks reason to think that she 
tracks the truth and should reduce confidence in the beliefs if the following conditions hold: (1) 
she discovers that the population she is in was unlikely to evolve that psychological process; (2) 
her justification or confidence in her belief is due to a defeasible assumption that it is the product 
of a reliable or truth tracking process; and (3) she believes that the truth value of the proposition 
would not vary in the circumstances where the population would have evolved a process that 
produced different beliefs about the proposition. I apply this argument to basic humans intuitions 
about what considerations are relevant for fairly distributing resources. I will support premise (1) 
in subsequent sections; here I will discuss premise (2) and (3).  
In policy contexts and ordinary life we frequently encounter conflicts about fairness—
about how resources should be distributed within a society in which people have different needs 
and capacities for contributing to resource production, how wealth produced by labor should be 
apportioned when others own the means of production, whether drastic income inequality is ok, 
who should have the last slice of cake, whether one sibling should receive more stickers than 
another, etc. There is substantial disagreement even within Western societies on some of these 
questions and about what how resources should be distributed in specific scenarios. Across 
cultures, there are also substantial differences in how people respond to opportunities to 
distribute resources. However, it is possible that across cultures, people tend to treat several 
considerations as sometimes relevant to whether a distribution is fair. The considerations I will 
focus on are equality, equity, and need. My claim is that even if there is cross- and within-
cultural agreement about the relevance of these considerations, and even if the proximal factors 
that influence judgments about fairness and developmental trajectories of these fairness 
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intuitions give us no reason to doubt their relevance, we should still decrease confidence in their 
relevance for fairness because humans could have plausibly evolved entirely different fairness 
processes that produced intuitions that did not count equality, or equity, or need as considerations 
relevant to fairness. I take it that in the conditions where we might have evolved these different 
fairness intuitions, realism and commonsense morality would say that the truth value of whether 
these three considerations are relevant for resource distribution would be the same.46 In addition, 
I assume that our basic intuitions about equality, equity, and need are not inferred from other 
moral beliefs (admittedly a substantial assumption; see Graham, Iyer, and Meindl (n.d.) for 
discussion of this question), and that our reason for holding them is a defeasible assumption that 
they are the product of a reliable process or a process that enables us to track their truth. 
I should stress that the argument of this chapter hinges on the premise that humans were 
not likely to acquire the particular fairness process that we have. There are other types of moral 
beliefs produced by processes that we may have been much more likely to acquire—it may be 
the case, for instance, that humans were highly likely to have a faculty that produced intuitions 
that harm to close relations is prima facie bad. This argument, like the arguments in the previous 
chapter, is a selective debunking argument.  
4.3 FAIRNESS NORMS 
By fairness norms I mean any norms about how resources should be distributed amongst 
                                                 
46 Metaethical positions such as social constructivism that say that the truth value of the relevant 
propositions would vary in those other circumstances will not be vulnerable to this argument. 
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individuals—for instance, that if Person A and Person B are equally in need and A receives an 
unearned windfall (and there are no other agents involved), A should share some of that windfall 
with B; or that if A did more work than B to obtain some resources, all else being equal, more 
resources should be given to A; or that windfall resources should always be kept to oneself. The 
norm may be formulated in terms of what ought to be done, or which distribution is better, or 
whether a person should be punished for their distribution decision, or that a distribution being of 
a particular type is a reason against it. All societies seem to have norms about distributing 
resources—traditions and expectations about how people distribute resources in various 
circumstances, about punishing individuals who distribute resources in certain ways, and 
motivation to comply with these traditions and punish those who do not. As Hertel et al. (2002) 
observe, “few would doubt that people are at least motivated to appear to be fair, that they feel 
more comfortable with fair solutions, and that charges of unfairness are serious reproaches in 
many kinds of conflict negotiations” (328). I will focus on norms about the distribution of 
windfall goods and goods that are earned via some task,47 and norms about what resources are 
owed to whom, more generally. Much of the evidence on this question comes from economic 
games such as the Ultimatum Game, Dictator Game, Public Goods Game, and Third-Party 
                                                 
47 Interestingly, one complication is that, as Henrich et al. (2004) observe, norms about how 
resources should be distributed may vary according to what resource is in question; different 
resources are often governed by different sharing rules. This may be due to the different ways in 
which those different goods are typically acquired—whether they are typically obtained by 
chance or labor, etc. (44). 
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Punishment Game.48 
                                                 
48 In the simplest Ultimatum game, Player 1 is given some quantity of resources. Player 1 must 
propose to give some proportion of the resource to Player 2. Player 2, who knows how much of 
the resource Player 1 was given and what proportion of that resource Player 1 is offering, may 
then accept or reject the offer. If Player 2 rejects the offer, Player 1 receives nothing. This is a 
one shot game. The players are usually anonymous to each other. Rational choice theory predicts 
that Player 1 should make the lowest offer possible and Player 2 should accept any offer. 
People’s decisions about what to do in these games can serve as a rough indication of what the 
subject thinks the norms are about what ought to be done in the situation. 
The public goods games may come in the form of the Voluntary Contributions game, where 
subjects may contribute to a pot, and a Common Pool Resources game, where subjects may 
refrain from removing resources from a general pot.  In each of these games, the money in the 
pot is subsequently increased by 50% or doubled by the experimenter and redistributed to each 
subject equally. This game works as a measure of beliefs about fairness norms by using how 
much people contribute to the pot or refrain from taking from the pot as an indicator of how 
much of a resource they think they should contribute in a situation where the payoff structure 
means that the group would be best off if everyone contributed some high level of their 
resources, but that if everyone else is contributing at that level it would be in the individual’s 
interest to contribute nothing. So one’s decision is also influenced by how one expects the others 
to act, which is presumably influenced in part by one’s assessment of the norms that others 
follow. 
 109 
Norms about resource distribution interact with other sorts of norms. Haidt has proposed 
subdomains of morality (moral foundations theory) having to do with harm and caring, loyalty 
and betrayal, fairness and cheating, authority and subversion, sanctity and degradation, and 
liberty and oppression (Haidt and Joseph 2004). Factors that may affect judgments about whether 
a person should receive resources include the degree to which they helped accomplish a task, 
their level of need (more rarely), their status or position in society, etc. So norms about harm and 
caring, hierarchy and ingroup or outgroup status interact with norms about resource distribution. 
Reciprocity also affects distribution questions, as do norms about generosity, beneficence, and 
wellbeing. In addition, the question of resource distribution is intricately connected with 
questions of property, which does not fit neatly in Haidt’s moral foundations theory; I will not be 
able to explore this relationship here. Most broadly, fairness might be thought to have to do with 
how individuals are treated in relation to each other—not just how resources are distributed but 
also how information is distributed, whether people are treated kindly or badly, etc., and whether 
punishments are administered in a fair way (Mikula et al. 1990), but I focus here just on resource 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Dictator game is a more direct measure than the Ultimatum or public good games of the 
norms that might be guiding a person distributing resources. In the dictator game, again a one-
shot interaction between two people, Person 1 is given some resources and then given the 
opportunity to give some of those resources to Person 2. It is in the monetary interest of the giver 
to offer nothing. When Person 1’s offer deviates from 0 it may indicate compliance with a norm 
about how to distribute windfall resources when one has the opportunity to share them with 
another person. The Third Party Punishment game is the Dictator game where a third party 
observes and has the opportunity to punish the Dictator, usually at a cost to the third party. 
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distribution.  
We do not have extensive information about the proximal influences on people’s fairness 
judgments about particular situations. Aside from the fact that many people respond to things 
like equality, equity, and need, there is some evidence that various of these judgments may be 
influenced by anger, guilt, regret, gratitude, and fear (Nelissen et al. 2011, O’Mara et al. 2011, 
Batson et al. 2007). Whether people are more inclined to punish proposers or compensate victims 
of unequal resource distributions in the Dictator game is influenced by their propensity to 
empathy (Leliveld et al. 2012). Some research suggests that injustice judgments are processed in 
one way in victims of unequal distributions and in a different way by third party bystanders: 
“The first, more typical of victims, is characterized by strong feelings of annoyance, 
disappointment, depression and/or helplessness; a pronounced sense of injustice; and a larger 
number of action-related remarks. The second, more typical of observers, is a rather cool and 
detached response to unfair events in which the major part of cognitive activity consists of 
reflections, evaluations and assessments” (Lupfer et al., 407). There is also evidence that 
people’s fairness judgments tend to slightly favor themselves, which Hertel et al. (2002) propose 
may be more common in contexts of competitiveness than in contexts of cooperation (338). 
Currently, the psychological story about the proximal influences on fairness judgments is highly 
incomplete. My argument in this chapter, though, is that even if we ultimately find that the 
psychological causes of fairness judgments are consistent with the possibility that we track the 
truth of these questions, a distal debunking argument will lead us to conclude we should reduce 
confidence in the relevance of factors of equality, equity, and need for the question of how 
resources should be distributed. In the next section, I will argue that the empirical evidence about 
the development of intuitions about resource distribution in Westerners is consistent with truth 
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tracking. Then I will turn to my evolutionary debunking argument.  
4.4 DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN FAIRNESS INTUITIONS 
Children are disposed from very early on to look for norms, acquire and follow norms, and 
punish norm violators. Children “monitor others for emotive cues of proper behavior” 
(Richerson and Henrich 2012, 46) and they can infer the existence of a norm simply based on 
observing costly behavior, or the example of others, though they are selective in determining 
whose behavior or explicitly expressed norms to adopt (e.g. Schmidt et al. 2012). The system by 
which children acquire norms appears to be very flexible in some domains, such as in the purity 
domain and in games, in the sense children can easily acquire a wide variety of norms (at least 
harmless ones) in those domains, even in the absence of any apparent reason for the norm 
(Rottman and Kelemen 2012, Rakoczy et al. 2008).  
Although there is substantial flexibility in moral norm acquisition generally, at least for 
fairness norms there does seem to be a developmental pattern that Western children exhibit. 
Western children tend to systematically acquire certain fairness norms, or beliefs that certain 
considerations are relevant for fairness. These children note the existence of and acquire dislike 
for inequality involving themselves before the age of three (LoBue et al. 2009), begin to acquire 
beliefs related to others’ property at around three (Rossano et al. 2011; see also Friedman and 
Neary 2008), and begin to talk about fairness as if it is a reason that counts for or against certain 
proposed distributions at age 5 or 6; they defend their objection to unequal distributions by 
appealing to fairness considerations that they presumably expect others to respond to (discussed 
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in LoBue et al. 2009, 156).49 As they develop, they sequentially acquire certain norms and 
beliefs in the relevance of certain considerations. Early on, children follow a simple equality 
norm in cases not involving themselves. When given the opportunity to distribute goods to 
others, for instance distributing stickers to dolls, they tend to distribute the goods equally 
(Schmidt et al. 2012). When dividing unearned goods between themselves and others, they 
appear to be guided by both self-interest and equality concerns. They keep most of the resource 
themselves up until ages 6 or 7, giving more to their partner as they age, though Warneken et al. 
(2011) found that three-year-olds shared earned resources mostly equally. Their level of giving 
in contexts like the Dictator game also tends to increase over time (Richerson and Henrich, 46).  
When distributing rewards for work done, at age 5-6, children give rewards equally, 
ignoring quantity of work done (Larsen and Kellogg 1974; Lerner 1974). Later, they start to treat 
amount of work performed as relevant—they give somewhat more to those who worked more, 
but their distribution is not strictly proportional to amount of work done; only as adolescents 
does strict proportionality occur (see McCrink et al. 2010 for discussion). An age entitlement 
rule, in which the child gives more resources to older or bigger individuals, has also been 
observed among some four and five year olds, but then disappears (Thomson and Jones 2005). 
(One might wonder whether this is related to recognition of greater need, deference to higher 
status individuals warranting more, or a factor distinct from fairness, such as recognition that the 
older person could coerce one to give them more resources). At some point after age 5 they 
acquire a belief that those who contributed more to a task that produced the resource may or 
                                                 
49 Children also spontaneously share toys from eight months, but it is not at all clear that this is 
some sort of precursor to fairness norms (LoBue et al. 2009, 155). 
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should receive more than those that did less (e.g. Thomson and Jones 2005 says this happens 
around age 7). Some eight year olds have been found to apply a benevolence rule in favor of 
those that are financially needy (see discussion in Thomson and Jones 2005). In older children, 
distribution may also be influenced by whether recipients are friends or strangers (McGillicuddy-
DeLisi et al. 1994) Consideration of a person’s capacity to contribute to a joint task becomes 
common only much later: a majority of ninth graders and college students in one study took 
physical disability into consideration when distributing payment to three siblings who worked 
together on a task—those concerned with equity seemed to take into account that the disabled 
child could not contribute as much to the task as the others (Thomson and Jones 2005; see also 
McCrink et al 2010).  
This is a quick sketch of some of the evidence on the development of fairness norms in 
Westerners, but the existence of this kind of pattern of norm acquisition could be consistent with 
Western populations tracking the truth of fair distribution of resources. Individuals in the West 
systematically develop beliefs about the relevance of a set of considerations for the question of 
whether particular resource distributions are fair. Among these considerations are equality—
equal distribution to individuals involved; equity—distribution proportional to amount of work 
put in to obtain the resource; and need. Other potentially relevant factors are self-interest, one’s 
relationship to others, people’s capacity to help obtain a resource, and some sort of age 
consideration (that might reflect need or hierarchy factors). Supposing that whether these factors 
are relevant for fairness is invariant over individuals within the culture, the fact that individuals 
systematically acquire concern for a set of factors relevant to fairness judgments is consistent 
with the possibility that individuals in the West track the truth. On the other hand, it is not 
knockdown evidence that these people do track the truth, so it is worth looking at the process by 
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which they obtained this developmental process to see how it bears on truth tracking. 
Less data is available about the proximal influences on and development of norms about 
resource distribution in non-Western cultures. However, because the norms that are the target of 
this chapter are not specific norms about how resources should be distributed in a particular case 
but rather the idea that equality, equity, and need are sometimes relevant to fairness, I think it is 
reasonable to start with the assumption that in most cultures notions about fairness involve these 
factors.  
4.5 EVOLUTION OF FAIRNESS INTUITIONS 
Now I will support the claim that human populations could have plausibly evolved a capacity 
and inclination to make judgments about whether distributions of resources are fair that involved 
different intuitions about the nature of fairness. Among other things, we could have been inclined 
to treat need or equity as irrelevant to fairness or could have treated anything less than 
hypergenerous, selfless distributions as unfair.  
The evidence about the probability that our fairness process could have been one that 
produces different intuitions comes in part from what we know about the conditions in which 
these kinds of norms are likely to emerge in or spread through a population and what we know 
about the evolutionary functions that beliefs in these norms may serve. I should emphasize that 
by the evolution of fairness norms, the process I have in mind is evolution understood to include 
socio-cultural change and multiple modes of inheritance—not just genetic. So change in human 
fairness developmental processes could occur over generations via changes to e.g. systems of 
rules transmitted by instruction and imitation, learned emotional reactions to certain resource 
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distributions, dispositions to dislike certain distribution schemes independent of any imitation, 
individual or cultural inclinations to view the world as just, capacity for empathy-development in 
various childhood environments, etc.  
I will highlight three sources of evidence to support the claim that people could have 
evolved fairness intuitions that conflict with those observed in Western populations: (1) that 
other norms about distribution reasonably likely to come into being are sustainable in a 
population, (2) that norms inconsistent with the norms identified as characteristic of the West are 
systematically maintained among minorities in Western populations, and that frequency-
dependent selection and selection for multiple norms in a population may plausibly apply to 
fairness norms, and (3) supposing the evolutionary function of fairness norms is to facilitate 
cooperation, we could have had cooperation without our fairness norms, because there are a 
variety of mechanisms that can promote cooperation.  
I will begin with the point that other norms governing resource distribution were 
reasonably likely to come into being and could have been sustained in the population. In some 
conditions, selection may favor the unequal distribution of power and resources, making 
selfishness in leaders more advantageous. Makowsky and Smaldino (2014) developed a model 
involving multilevel selection and interaction between groups found that in conditions of 
substantial intergroup conflict, less democratic, more hierarchical groups with selfish leaders 
outcompeted groups where power was distributed more equally. In such contexts, there could be 
selection pressure in favor of a norm system for resource distribution driven primarily to ensure 
that the leader or dominant member of the group receives sufficient resources, regardless of the 
effects this has on levels of equality, equity, or need of non-leaders.   
Boyd and Richerson (2005) and others have shown that the mechanisms that support 
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prosocial norms, such as reputation, punishment, and signaling, can stabilize norms that are 
selectively neutral or disadvantageous for the individual or the group (see also Richerson and 
Henrich 2012). Boyd and Richerson (2005) observe, “A problem with the multiplicity of 
proximal mechanisms for sustaining equilibria is that the different mechanisms and equilibria 
likely exhibit a wide range of functionality. We can imagine several mechanisms by which 
dysfunctional norms/institutions can become established. Exogenous changes may make an 
institution obsolete, yet it may be sustained by the mechanisms we have reviewed. … Predatory 
elites and other self-interested subgroups with some form of coercive power may be able to 
establish equilibria that disproportionately benefit them” (50). Because the systems supporting 
fairness norms have this flexibility, they are capable of supporting systems of norms that 
contradict current Western fairness norms. Once they come into existence in a population, norms 
other than the ones we have may be sustainable.  
Even if our environmental circumstances were not substantially different, we might have 
evolved a different set of norms because multiple systems of resource distribution may be 
supportable in a single set of circumstances. In their crosscultural studies on fairness norms using 
Dictator, Ultimatum, and Third-Party Punishment games, Henrich et al. (2010) found that 
responses to games were generally correlated with level of market integration, but some 
economically similar societies in their study appear to have very different principles—e.g. Au 
and Tsimane societies have a similarly low level of market integration, but the Tsimane offered 
much less on average in the Dictator game than the Au.  
Indeed, in many models used to investigate how certain equality norms or behaviors 
might have come about, there are multiple norm equilibria. As part of an effort to explain the 
existence of norms favoring equal division of resources, Zollman (2008) argues that complexity 
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of environment—specifically a hybrid of a Nash bargaining game and the ultimatum game—is 
one reason an equality norm may be favored.50 Past literature offers models in which Nash 
bargaining games produce equal divisions of goods, but few in which the ultimatum game 
successfully results in equal divisions of goods. Zollman (2008) found that in some games that 
combined Nash bargaining games and the ultimatum game, equal divisions are more likely to 
evolve than in either of the component games. In the Nash bargaining game, one finds a fair 1/2, 
1/2 equilibrium, a “nonfair” equilibrium, and “hyperfair” equilibria. If our fairness norms 
originated in these conditions, humans could have easily been disposed to divide resources 
heavily in favor of the other person or heavily in their own favor.  
Secondly, I claim that there is sustained disagreement about fairness norms in the West—
for instance, about whether equity or need matters in a given case of resource distribution—and 
this diversity within the population suggests the possibility of an entire human population being 
unconcerned with considerations like equity or need when it comes to fairness. Evidence of this 
deep disagreement comes from research on conservatives, especially libertarians, and liberals, 
different fairness judgments produced by proself and prosocial subjects, and the diversity of 
responses within Western populations to economic games. In studies on Western university 
students, the mode in a public goods game was at 0 contributions, and a secondary mode was at 
                                                 
50 In a Nash bargaining game, two subjects are given a windfall to divide. Each proposes a 
proportion of the resource she wishes to keep. If the amount the subjects wanted to keep exceeds 
the total quantity of resources, neither receives anything; if the amounts the subjects wanted to 
keep is less than the total quantity of resources, each receives what she requested. 
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100% contributions (Henrich et al, 22).51 Stouten et al. (2005) found in a group of Western 
subjects that the subjects more concerned with their own outcomes (proself subjects) were more 
likely to support equality of contributions out of a concern for efficiency than subjects more 
concerned with society (prosocial subjects), who were more likely to support equality of 
contributions because to do otherwise would be “unfair”—only the latter group continued to 
support equal contributions in a situation where it was not required for efficiency. 
Third, humans could be cooperative without the norms about resources distribution that 
Westerners currently have. Many people have suggested that sociality and cooperation are key 
features of being human; if different resources distribution norms prevented sociality and 
cooperation, one might object to my argument by saying that it would not be quite right to say 
that humans could have easily had different resources distribution norms, because in doing so we 
would lose a key component of humanity. However, there are a variety of mechanisms that can 
                                                 
51 Across cultures, there is also substantial diversity: Henrich et al. report, “The Machiguenga, 
for example, have a mode at full defection, but lack any fully cooperative contributions—which 
yields a mean contribution of 22 percent. Both the Ache and Tsimane experiments yielded means 
between 40 and 60 percent, like folks from industrialized societies, but, unlike industrial 
societies, they show unimodal distributions with peaks at 50 and 66.7 percent, respectively. Their 
distributions resemble inverted American distributions with few or no contributions at full free 
riding and full cooperation. Like the Ache and Tsimane, the Onna and Huinca have modes near 
the center of the distribution, at 40 and 50 percent respectively, but they also show secondary 
peaks at full cooperation (100 percent)-and no contributions at full defection” (Henrich et al. 
2010, 22). 
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enable cooperation. According to Richerson and Henrich (2012), “In recent years, theorists have 
discovered many mechanisms that can stabilize cooperation (Chudek, Zhao, and Henrich 
forthcoming). Various forms of punishment, ostracism of non-cooperators, assortative formation 
of groups with like propensities to cooperate, cooperation provided as a costly signal in a mating 
game, and other situations in which payoffs in one game are linked to another by reputations are 
among the plausible mechanisms that have been studied” (66). Several of these could support the 
evolution of cooperation without anyone believing equality, equity, or need is relevant for the 
fair division of goods. Another possibility is that we could have been motivated to act in a way 
that is consistent with a set of fairness rules similar to our own but to do it on the basis of norms 
about resource distribution that conflict with the relevance of equality, equity and need. Forber 
and Smead (2014) have shown that it is possible for a behavior of offering an even split of 
resources to spread in a population as a result of spiteful behavior in an ultimatum game. It is 
plausible that it could be advantageous for individual humans to cooperate even without norms 
favoring equal or equitable distribution of goods because even the weakest members of society 
are better off cooperating and getting scraps than going off on their own. The many contexts in 
human history where cooperation actually was forced by violence or drastic power imbalances 
likewise support the idea that we could easily be cooperative and social without thinking 
equality, equity or need are relevant to how resources should be distributed.  
Furthermore, I claim that in these alternative scenarios where humans might have had 
societies with different sets of norms about the fair distribution of resources, the most likely way 
that these norm systems would be supported is by people having correspondingly different basic 
intuitions about fairness. Given that much of human behavior is motivated by moral beliefs, and 
given the flexibility of the human norm acquisition system, (and people’s willingness even now 
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to endorse moral rules that work against their individual interests), it is reasonable to think these 
alternative systems of resource distribution would be maintained and propagated by human 
moral beliefs about how goods should and should not be distributed. In sum, it is plausible that 
Westerner’s fairness beliefs could be different if evolution had proceeded slightly differently—
and indeed they may be expected to be different in the future when conditions change. The 
fairness norms that are assumed to prevail in the West—concern for equality, equity, and need—
are improbable.  
4.6 OBJECTIONS 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that Schafer (2010) raises an objection to evolutionary 
debunking arguments that rely on the premise that our moral intuitions were unlikely to evolve. 
The objection denies this premise, and says that evolution was actually likely to produce many of 
our moral beliefs: “the current state of evolutionary theory supports the claim that we would 
have developed normative faculties that are sensitive to factors like our pain and the pain of 
those related to us, beginning from a wide range of initial conditions. And it supports a similar 
claim about the range of initial conditions from which we would have developed normative 
faculties that were sensitive to issues of reciprocity. But so long as we are sensitive to these sorts 
of factors, and have our general capacities for normative reasoning and reflection, we stand a 
good chance of arriving at normative judgments that are reasonably reliable, at least by our 
present lights” (482). Similarly, White writes, “natural selection is likely to favor creatures with 
a sense of obligation toward their offspring” (2010, 589).  I will not deny that there may be some 
types of moral intuitions that humans were likely to evolve in a range of conditions, but my 
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claim is that we were reasonably unlikely to evolve the particular intuitions about resource 
distribution that we have.  And even if other types of moral intuitions were likely to evolve, I am 
inclined to think that it may not be possible to reason our way from one type of moral intuitions 
to others (e.g. we might have intuitions about purity without being able to reason from those to 
intuitions about harm; we may need basic intuitions about harm in order to infer the rest of our 
harm norms). Even if we had norms about harm, purity, and authority, I do not think we could 
infer all of our norms about fair distribution of resources.    
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The evidence about the proximal causes and developmental trajectory of fairness intuitions (at 
least, for Westerners) may be consistent with the possibility of tracking the truth. However, a 
look at the evolutionary origins of the psychological and developmental processes that produce 
intuitions about how resources should be distributed suggest that human populations could 
relatively easily have beliefs about fair resource distribution that do not take into consideration 
equality, equity, or need. In combination with the idea that the relevance of equality, equity, or 
need for fairness would not be different in those other circumstances, and that our reason for 
believing that these three factors matter for fairness is a defeasible assumption that the process 
producing these intuitions is truth tracking, the finding that humans were not particularly likely 
to obtain these views about fairness should lead us to reduce confidence in our belief that these 




5.0  CONCLUSION 
I have argued that in the moral domain, when we investigate the epistemic status of our beliefs, 
we should be concerned primarily with whether we track the truth of moral propositions. If there 
are any obligations that humans have, there are certain propositions related to the nature of those 
obligations and the means of achieving them that would be valuable to match—having matching 
attitudes about these propositions at the appropriate times would make us more likely to 
complete our obligations. An important task for the future will be to spell out in further detail 
methods for identifying such propositions. If humans do have obligations, we should do what we 
can to improve our chances of matching relevant propositions at appropriate times. For this 
reason, it is worthwhile to investigate whether our current moral beliefs track truth.  
Empirical research on the causes of moral beliefs offers us information relevant for 
assessing whether we track moral truths. I have characterized three types of debunking 
arguments that can employ information about the causes of beliefs. These are the malfunctioning 
component argument, the argument from inconsistent variability, the inappropriately improbable 
belief argument, and its higher order variant, the inappropriately improbable process argument. 
Each is a selective debunking argument that may be applied to subsets of moral beliefs. The 
malfunctioning component argument, the argument from inconsistent variability, the 
inappropriately improbable belief arguments can lead to the conclusion that an agent does not 
track the truth of a proposition. The inappropriately improbable process argument can undermine 
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one’s reasons for thinking one tracks truth. These arguments are distinct from existing etiological 
debunking arguments in the literature. Furthermore, they permit us to assess the epistemic status 
of types of moral beliefs without appealing to assumptions about the moral irrelevance of certain 
causes or the unreliability of certain processes. Instead, the arguments can lead us to the 
conclusion that a factor is morally irrelevant or that a process is unreliable.  
I developed versions of these arguments for several types of moral beliefs. I concluded 
that we do not track the truth of moral beliefs that hinge on sympathy, moral beliefs influenced 
by disgust, certain moral political beliefs, and beliefs about punishment that are vulnerable to the 
influence of extraneous emotions. For each of these types of moral beliefs, the conclusion about 
epistemic status was the product of information about proximal rather than causes. Lastly, I 
argued that, given certain assumptions, we lack a reason to think that we track the truth about the 
relevance of equality, equity, and need for the fair distribution of resources.  
Each of the debunking arguments that I developed may be applied to other types of moral 
beliefs. Other types of moral beliefs worth investigating are beliefs related to authority, respect, 
hierarchy, and liberty, loyalty, deception, and property. Other types of causes to consider in the 
future when assessing whether moral beliefs track truth are conscious reasoning, unconscious 
application of moral rules, reflective equilibrium, other emotions, such as anger and envy, and 
the evolutionary origins of other types of moral beliefs. Because the arguments that I have 
discussed are selective, though, there remains the possibility that some types of moral beliefs will 
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